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ABOUT THE  
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a 
non-partisan public policy and law institute that focuses on fundamental issues 
of democracy and justice. Our work ranges from voting rights to redistricting  
reform, from access to the courts to presidential power in the fight against  
terrorism. A singular institution – part think tank, part public interest law firm,  
part advocacy group – the Brennan Center combines scholarship, legislative  
and legal advocacy, and communications to win meaningful, measurable 
change in the public sector.
ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER’S  
REDISTRICTING PROJECT
The Brennan Center is a leader in the fight for just and equitable redistricting 
procedures across the country. We are currently counseling advocates in the 
Midwest on how best to maximize their goals of diversity, accountability, and 
fairness through redistricting reform. Building on our analyses of successful 
and unsuccessful reform initiatives in states like Arizona, California, and Ohio, 
and our extensive study of redistricting practices nationwide, we have submitted  
testimony and helped draft legislation to shape and advance the reform agenda. 
We have also filed friend-of-the-court briefs in many of the major cases addressing 
the use of redistricting for undue partisan gain or at the expense of minority voters.
The Center offers top-flight legal and policy expertise to advocates and officials 
on the national and state level seeking to develop effective redistricting bills 
and initiatives. We facilitate consensus on policy goals and then translate those 
goals into language appropriate for legislation or ballot measures. The Center 
reviews and analyzes text drafted by others for potential constitutional and 
other legal problems. Once legislation is introduced, Brennan Center attorneys 
accept invitations to deliver written and oral expert testimony.
Finally, the Center’s publications and public advocacy have amplified the values 
of redistricting reform: counting the population and redrawing the district lines  
in a way that is equitable, fair, and sensitive to diversity. In anticipation of the 
round of redistricting following the 2000 Census, the Brennan Center offered 
The Real Y2K Problem, an accessible analysis of the technical and legal issues 
facing legislators and reform advocates in redrawing the nation’s legislative and 
congressional districts. Our publication Beyond the Color Line? focuses on the 
ramifications of redistricting, and the litigation that often results, for race and 
representation. Brennan Center attorneys have also authored numerous law 
review articles, magazine pieces, and opinion pieces detailing the promises and 
challenges of redistricting in the public interest.
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Members of Congress and state legislators are 
elected from districts; at least once per decade, 
the district lines are redrawn, block by block. 
In most states, these legislative district lines are 
drawn by the legislators themselves.
The way the lines are drawn can keep a community 
together or split it apart, leaving it without a  
representative who feels responsible for its concerns. 
The way the lines are drawn can change who 
wins an election. Ultimately, the way the lines are 
drawn can change who controls the legislature, 
and which laws get passed.
RedistRicting matteRs. 
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INTRODUCTION
Our representatives in local, state, and federal government set the rules by which  
we live. In ways large and small, they affect the taxes we pay, the food we eat, 
the air we breathe, the ways in which we make each other safer and more 
secure. Periodically, we hold elections to make sure that these representatives 
continue to listen to us.
All of our legislators in state government, many of our legislators in local 
government, and most of our legislators in Congress are elected from districts, 
which divide a state and its voters into geographical territories. In most of these 
districts, all of the voters are ultimately represented by the candidate who wins 
the most votes in the district. The way that voters are grouped into districts 
therefore has an enormous influence on who our representatives are, and what 
policies they fight for. For example, a district composed mostly of farmers is 
likely to elect a representative who will fight for farmers’ interests, but a district 
composed mostly of city dwellers may elect a representative with different 
priorities. Similarly, districts drawn with large populations of the same race, or 
ethnicity, or language, or political party are more likely to elect representatives 
with the same characteristics.
Every so often, a state’s district lines – for both Congress and the state legislature –  
are redrawn, grouping different sets of voters together in new ways. Sometimes, 
the way that a particular district is redrawn directly affects who can win the 
next election. And together, the way that the districts are redrawn can affect the 
composition of the legislative delegation or legislature as a whole. Many believe 
that we would have different representatives, federal and state, if the district 
lines were drawn differently.
In addition to affecting large political trends, the way that district lines are 
drawn can have very specific consequences. For instance, in some cases, new 
lines may be redrawn to leave an incumbent’s house out of the district she used 
to represent, making it difficult or impossible for her to run for re-election to 
represent most of her old constituents unless she moves. Other times, lines may 
be drawn to include the homes of two incumbents in the same party, forcing 
them to run against each other or retire, and in either case, knocking one of 
them out of the legislature. Often, sitting legislators from the party controlling 
the legislature are also in control of drawing new lines, leaving them free to 
target challengers, or legislators from an opposing party.
Occasionally, the process of redrawing district lines gets a lot of attention. 
In 2003, there was a big controversy in Texas; one party tried to redraw the 
district lines for Congress after a court had already redrawn the lines just a few 
years before, and legislators in the other party actually fled the state – twice 
– to try to stop the redrawing.
INTRODUCTION
DIFFERENT REDISTRICTING PLANS
District	lines	group	voters	into	districts,	with	each	district		
electing	a	different	representative.	District	lines	can	be	
drawn	in	many	different	ways.
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More often, this “redistricting” gets much less attention in the press. But even 
when it does not make the front page, it is extremely important in determining 
which communities are represented and how vigorously – which is in turn 
extremely important to determining which laws get made.
There are many different ways to figure out which voters are grouped together 
to elect a representative. Whether the way that districts are currently drawn 
in any given state is good or bad depends on what you believe the goals of the 
process to be. Some stress objectivity; some independence; some transparency, 
or equality, or regularity, or other goals entirely. There is ample debate among 
scholars, activists, and practitioners about the role of political insiders, the nature 
of protection for minority rights, the degree of partisan competition or partisan 
inequity, and the ability to preserve established or burgeoning communities. But  
to date, this discussion has been inaccessible to most of the people directly affected. 
This publication is intended to present the redistricting process for state and 
federal government, and for many local governments, in digestible parts. There 
are many moving components, complex issues that we attempt to describe in 
simple and straightforward fashion, piece by piece. This is a guide to the rules 
for drawing district lines – a description of how it works today, how it could 
work in the future, and what it all means. Consider it an owners’ manual, for 
those who should own the process: we, the people. 
RELATED TOPICS: Simulated Redistricting
After leafing through this owners’ manual, feel 
like an entertaining and informative redistricting 
test drve? 
At www.redstrctnggame.org, The Redistricting 
Game lets you draw and redraw the districts 
of a hypothetical state under several different 
scenarios, with instant feedback on the con-
sequences. It’s a good way to see for yourself how 
some of the parts of the redistricting process  
fit together.
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
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I.  WHAT IS REDISTRICTING?
We start with some definitions, to make sure that we are all talking about the 
same thing. 
Even those who follow the issue may confuse three related terms: “reapportion-
ment,” “redistricting,” and “gerrymandering.” So what do they all mean?
Apportionment is the process of allocating seats in a legislature – two legislators 
here, three legislators there. On the federal level, the United States Constitution 
requires that seats in the House of Representatives be apportioned to states 
according to the population count in the federal census, conducted every ten 
years.1 On the state level, most states maintain a fixed number of legislators, 
but some let the size of the legislature grow or shrink as the population grows 
or shrinks.2 Reapportionment, then, is the process every ten years of deciding, 
based on population, how many representatives a state will receive.
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the size of the House of Rep-
resentatives grew as the United States population expanded and states entered 
the Union. For example, New York was assigned 6 federal Congressmembers in 
1789, then 10 Congressmembers in 1790, and 17 Congressmembers in 1800 
– and the House of Representatives grew accordingly.3 However, in 1911 and 
1929, Congress passed laws that ultimately fixed the number of House seats at  
435.4 Now, each state gets a portion of the 435 seats, depending on its population. 
After each census, states may therefore gain or lose House seats if their population 
grows more quickly or more slowly than the rest of the country.
For example, California grew substantially during the 1980s, and gained seven 
seats in the House after the 1990 census.5 It gained an additional seat after 
2000.6 New York, on the other hand, lost population relative to other states; 
though it grew, it grew more slowly than the rest of the country. And the number 
of its Congressmembers dropped accordingly, falling from 34 to 31 after the 
1990 census, and down to 29 after 2000.7 The map to the right shows the seat 
shifts that resulted from the population shifts tallied by the 2000 census.8 
If reapportionment is the process of figuring out whether New York has 29 
federal Congressmembers, rather than 28 or 30, redistricting is how we know 
which New York voters each of the 29 Congressmembers represents. Put  
differently, after the number of legislators has been set, redistricting is the 
process of redrawing the lines of each legislative district. Representatives at all 
levels – school board, city council, state legislature, and Congress – may be 
elected from districts, and all of these lines are redrawn from time to time. The 
lines may be redrawn to account for big population shifts – for example, when 
an area has gained or lost seats through reapportionment. But they can also 
be redrawn at other times, for other reasons – or in a few states, for no reason 
at all. And redrawing the lines can have a substantial impact on how different 
Reapportionment is the process of using a 
state’s population to decide how many repre-
sentatives it gets.
Redistricting is the process of redrawing 
legislative district lines.
Gerrymandering is the process of redraw-
ing district lines to increase unduly a group’s 
political power.
SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES,  000
ALABAMA	 7
ALASKA	 1
ARIZONA	 8	 2
ARKANSAS	 4
CALIFORNIA	 63	1
COLORADO	 7	 1
CONNECTICUT	 6	 1
DELAWARE	 1
FLORIDA	 26	2
GEORGIA	 13	2
HAWAII	 2
IDAHO	 2
ILLINOIS	 19	1
INDIANA	 8	 1
IOWA	 6
KANSAS	 4
KENTUCKY	 8
LOUISIANA	 7
MAINE	 2
MARYLAND	 8
MASSACHUSETTS	 10
MICHIGAN	 15	1
MINNESOTA	 8
MISSISSIPPI	 4	 1
MISSOURI	 9
MONTANA	 1
NEBRASKA	 3
NEVADA	 3	 1
NEW	HAMPSHIRE	 2
NEW	JERSEY	 13
NEW	MEXICO	 3
NEW	YORK	 29	2
NORTH	CAROLINA	13	1
NORTH	DAKOTA	 1
OHIO	 18	1
OKLAHOMA	 6	 1
OREGON	 5
PENNSYLVANIA	 19	2
RHODE	ISLAND	 2
SOUTH	CAROLINA	 6
SOUTH	DAKOTA	 1
TENNESSEE		 9
TEXAS	 32	2
UTAH	 3
VERMONT		 1
VIRGINIA		 11	
WASHINGTON		 9
WEST	VIRGINIA		 3
WISCONSIN		 8	 1
WYOMING	 1
	GAINED SEATS
 LOST SEATS
{ NO CHANGE
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communities are grouped together. For example, the top map to the left shows 
Iowa’s congressional districts drawn after the 1990 census, and the bottom 
shows the districts after the 2000 census; though the state kept the same number 
of districts, each district’s borders changed substantially. 
Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of these district lines to affect 
political power. Every attempt to draw district lines has a political impact. But 
a gerrymander is a conscious and, according to opponents, undue attempt to 
draw district lines specifically to increase the likelihood of a particular political 
result. (Until a series of court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, some insiders  
achieved similar results through malapportionment – assigning unequal 
numbers of people to districts, and making some votes worth less than others 
– instead of redrawing the district lines.) Some believe that most gerrymanders 
are a natural part of the political process; others believe that they represent a 
distortion from a more equitable norm. 
Partisan gerrymandering occurs when the political party in control of the line 
drawing process draws districts to favor itself and limit opportunities for the 
opposition party. Incumbent protection gerrymandering, which is sometimes 
called “bipartisan” or “sweetheart” gerrymandering, occurs when those drawing 
the lines try to ensure that each party holds on to the districts it already controls, 
effectively divvying up the state to preserve the partisan status quo.
RELATED TOPICS: A Vote for DC
Washington, DC is apportioned one federal 
representative … sort of. Rep. Eleanor Holmes 
Norton, Washington’s at-large delegate in  
the House of Representatives, may sit on  
committees and participate in debate, but she  
is not allowed to vote. 
Many Americans have joined the citizens of  
the District of Columbia – almost 600,000 
people – in agitating for change, so that the 
District’s residents will no longer suffer  
“taxation without representation.” 
Despite what some believe to be constitutional 
uncertainty, there is increasing support for a 
federal bill that would grant the District a vote 
in return for an additional representative for Utah. 
Utah also believes that it has been denied 
adequate representation; the State claims that 
many of its citizens were not counted during 
the last Census because they were overseas  
at the time (for example, on missions on behalf 
of the Mormon church), and that the State’s 
true population would merit an additional 
representative.
IOWA CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
5
1
4
2
3
1 9 9 2
1
2
5 3
4
2 0 0 2
SOURCE: IOWA	LEGISLATIVE	SERVICE	BUREAU
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING
During the colonial period, long before the ratification of the Constitution 
in 1789, political insiders began to use malapportionment and other electoral 
structures for particular political gain. Redistricting is no exception. Patrick 
Henry, who opposed the new Constitution, tried to draw district lines to deny 
a seat in the first Congress to James Madison – the Constitution’s primary 
author. Henry made sure that Madison’s district was drawn to include counties 
that were more likely to oppose him.9 The attempt failed, and Madison was 
elected – but the American gerrymander had begun.
It is ironic that the man who inspired the term “gerrymander” actually served 
under Madison, the practice’s first American target. Just a few months before 
Elbridge Gerry became Madison’s vice president, as the Democratic-Republican 
governor of Massachusetts, Gerry signed a redistricting plan that was thought 
to ensure his party’s domination of the Massachusetts state senate. An artist 
added wings, claws, and the head of a particularly fierce-looking salamander  
creature to the outline of one particularly notable district; the beast was 
dubbed the “Gerry-mander” in the press, and the practice of changing the 
district lines to affect political power has kept the name ever since.10 
In most states, the gerrymander is alive and well, and politicians still carve 
states into districts for political gain, usually along partisan lines. The particular 
rules have changed in some ways since the eighteenth century, but Elbridge Gerry 
and Patrick Henry would find many familiar elements in redistricting today. 
In the 1780s, Patrick Henry tried to draw 
congressional district lines to keep James 
Madison out of office.
THE 11 “GERRYMANDER”
WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER? 
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II. WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
The way that district lines are drawn puts voters together in groups – some 
voters are kept together in one district and others are separated and placed into 
other districts. The lines can keep people with common interests together or 
split them apart. Depending on which voters are bundled together in a district, 
the district lines can make it much easier or much harder to elect any given 
representative, or to elect a representative responsive to any given community. 
And together, the district lines have the potential to change the composition of 
the legislative delegation as a whole.
We discuss below options for drawing the district lines, and the effects they 
may generally have. To keep the discussion concrete, however, we first offer a 
few anecdotes from the last few rounds of redistricting, showing the substantial 
impact that these redistricting decisions can have on our elections.
LETTING POLITICIANS CHOOSE THEIR VOTERS
After the 2000 census, when it came time to redraw district lines in California, 
state Democrats controlled the state legislature and the Governor’s mansion. 
Under California’s rules, this let the party, and particularly the sitting Democratic 
legislators, control the redistricting process for both the state legislature and 
for California’s Congressional delegation. However, Republicans threatened to 
put an initiative on the ballot, leaving the redistricting process to an uncertain 
public vote, if the Democrats got too greedy. Democrats also faced a threat that 
litigation over a redistricting plan would drive the process to the courts, potentially 
allowing the state supreme court – with six Republican appointees and only 
one Democratic appointee – to draw the lines. Ultimately, the two parties  
effectively decided to call a truce, and to keep the incumbents – of both parties 
– as safe from effective challenge as they could.11 
Democrats paid Michael Berman, a redistricting consultant, more than $1.3 
million to create the resulting redistricting plan. In addition, thirty of California’s 
32 Democratic members of Congress each gave Berman $20,000 in order to 
custom-design their individual districts for safety. As Rep. Loretta Sanchez 
explained: “Twenty thousand is nothing to keep your seat. I spend $2 million 
(campaigning) every year. If my colleagues are smart, they’ll pay their $20,000, 
and Michael will draw the district they can win in. Those who have refused to 
pay? God help them.”12 
WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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ELIMINATING INCUMBENTS
After the 2000 elections, just as Democrats controlled the redistricting process 
in California, Republicans controlled the redistricting process in Virginia. The  
Virginia Republicans used the redistricting pen to target Democratic Minority  
Leader Richard Cranwell, a 29-year veteran of the state legislature. They  
surgically carved his house, and 20 neighboring homes along the same street, 
out of the district he had represented, and placed them into the district of his 
22-year colleague, Democrat Chip Woodrum. The resulting district crossed 
both county and town lines, and with what fittingly looked like a tiny grasping  
hand, reached out to grab Cranwell’s residence.13 Rather than run against  
Woodrum in what was essentially Woodrum’s home district, Cranwell decided 
not to run for re-election in 2001.  
ELIMINATING CHALLENGERS
In the 2000 Democratic primary for a Brooklyn, NY, state legislative seat, 
newcomer Hakeem Jeffries challenged long-time incumbent Roger Green, and 
won more than 40% of the vote.14 Jeffries’ strong showing set the stage for a 
potential rematch. 
In the meantime, however, New York redrew its state legislative districts, in a 
process controlled by sitting legislators – including Roger Green. The redistricting  
process took the block where Jeffries’ house was located and carved it out of 
Green’s district.15 With Jeffries out of the picture, no candidate ran against 
Green in the 2004 primary, and he won the general election in November  
with 95% of the vote. Two years later, Hakeem Jeffries was able to move to  
a house within the redrawn district in order to run for the seat; he won the  
district’s primary election with 65% of the vote, and as the Democratic nominee  
in an overwhelmingly Democratic district, won the general election with 97% 
of the vote.16 
PACKING PARTISANS 
Just like they can be drawn around particular politicians, districts can be drawn 
around particular voters. There are many tools available to try to predict which 
voters will support a favored candidate, and those who draw the lines may try 
to put as many of those voters as possible within a given district, to protect  
incumbent legislators or give challengers a better chance, or to drain support 
for the opposition from neighboring districts. In so doing, the districts may 
split communities or stretch across vast swaths of a state. 
WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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HAKEEM		
JEFFRIES’
HOUSE
SOURCE: NEW	YORK	STATE	LEGISLATIVE	
TASK	FORCE	ON	DEMOGRAPHIC	
RESEARCH	AND	REAPPORTIONMENT
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In 1991, for example, Texas’s 6th Congressional District was designed to include  
as many loyal Republicans as possible, in part so that Democrats could control 
adjacent districts. As Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens described the 
district lines: 
 To the extent that it “begins” anywhere, it is probably near the home  
of incumbent Rep. Barton in Ennis, located almost 40 miles southwest  
of downtown Dallas. . . . It skips across two arms of Joe Pool Lake, noses  
its way into Dallas County, and then travels through predominantly 
Republican suburbs of Fort Worth. Nearing the central city, the  
borders dart into the downtown area, then retreat to curl around the  
city’s northern edge, picking up the airport and growing suburbs 
north of town. Worn from its travels into the far northwestern corner  
of the county (almost 70 miles, as the crow flies, from Ennis), the 
district lines plunge south into Eagle Mountain Lake, traveling along 
the waterline for miles, with occasional detours to collect voters that 
have built homes along its shores. Refreshed, the district rediscovers  
its roots in rural Parker County, then flows back toward Fort Worth 
from the southwest for another bite at Republican voters near the 
heart of that city. As it does so, the district narrows in places to not 
much more than a football field in width. Finally, it heads back 
into the rural regions of its fifth county – Johnson – where it finally 
exhausts itself only 50 miles from its origin, but hundreds of “miles 
apart in distance and worlds apart in culture.”17 
DILUTING MINORITY VOTES
When the Texas legislature next drew district lines, in 2003, there were further 
shenanigans. The redistricting battles were so bitterly fought that Democratic 
state legislators, then in the minority, fled to Oklahoma and New Mexico to 
prevent the state legislature from meeting; federal House Majority Leader Tom 
DeLay drew a formal ethics rebuke for using the FAA to try to track their plane.18 
Among other things, the Congressional redistricting plan that emerged moved 
about 100,000 Latino voters from one district (District 23) into an adjacent 
district (District 25) in order to protect a particular incumbent.19 The incumbent 
had lost support among Latinos in every election since 1996, and just before 
the lines were redrawn, Latinos had grown to a majority of the voting-age  
citizens in the district. Then the lines were redrawn, splitting off a sizable portion 
of the Latino community and replacing them in the district with voters  
more inclined to favor the incumbent.20 The plan ended up at the Supreme 
Court, which recognized that, “[i]n essence, the State took away the Latinos’ 
opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.”21 The Court forced 
Texas to redraw District 23, and the following year, the candidate of choice  
for the Latino community was elected.22 
WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
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SPLITTING COMMUNITIES 
In 1992, race riots in Los Angeles took a heavy toll on many neighborhoods, 
including the area known as Koreatown. It is estimated that the city suffered 
damages of more than $1 billion, much of it concentrated on businesses operated 
by Koreans and other Asian immigrants.23 
When residents of these neighborhoods appealed to their local officials for  
assistance with the cleanup and recovery effort, however, each of their purported 
representatives – members of the City Council and the state Assembly – passed 
the buck, claiming that the area was a part of another official’s district. The 
redistricting map, it turned out, fractured Koreatown. The area, barely over  
one mile square, was split into four City Council districts and five state  
Assembly districts, with no legislator feeling primarily responsible to the Asian-
American community.24 
WHY DOES REDISTRICTING MATTER?
WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING1
III. WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
Each state is responsible for drawing district lines both for its congressional 
delegation and for its state legislators. 
This redistricting process usually starts with the federal Census, which takes 
place every ten years. In March of years ending in “0” (1980, 1990, 2000, etc.), 
the Census Bureau sends out questionnaires and census workers to count the 
population, and compiles basic demographic data like gender, age, and race.25 
The Census Bureau spends the next few months adding up the data. By December 
31st of years ending in “0,” it sends population counts to the President.26 The 
President, in turn, passes the population figures along to Congress, along with 
a calculation of how many federal Congressmembers are apportioned to each 
state, using a formula set by federal statute.27 
Within one year of the federal Census, the Census Bureau also sends population 
data to the states.28 This information includes population counts by age and 
race, down to individual blocks.29 
As discussed below, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court ruled that legislative 
districts had to have approximately the same population, using figures that are 
reasonably up to date. For practical purposes, this means that district lines have 
to be redrawn at least once after every census, to account for population shifts.
Though the lines have to be redrawn after each census, in some states, district 
lines may be redrawn at any time – in the middle of a decade, even over and 
over. Other states have rules saying that district lines may not be redrawn before 
the next census, or that they may be redrawn only under certain circumstances 
– for example, if existing lines are struck down by a court. Moreover, most 
states have different rules for drawing congressional districts and for drawing 
state legislative districts. And some have no rules at all for when the district 
lines may be redrawn.30 
WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
The next Census will take place in 2010. The 
2012 elections will be the first ones conducted  
using the newly drawn districts.
RELATED TOPICS:  
Re-redistricting – Litigation & Legislation
In 2003, just two years after a court redrew 
Texas’ congressional district lines, the Texas 
legislature redrew the lines again. A challenge 
made its way to the Supreme Court, but the 
Court refused to strike down the re-redistricting  
as unconstitutional. In the wake of the decision, 
three federal bills were introduced to prohibit 
states from redrawing congressional districts 
more than once per decade. Versions of these  
bills are once again pending in the 110th Congress.
RELATED TOPICS: Census Count
The official Census count determines how 
many federal representatives each state gets, 
and is usually essential for allocating state 
representatives to different parts of the state. 
There is evidence, however, that minorities, 
children, low-income individuals, and renters 
are systematically undercounted, resulting in 
underrepresentation in the legislature. 
Moreover, incarcerated people – who are 
disproportionately minorities and poor – are 
generally counted where they are imprisoned, 
inflating representation of prison districts and 
diluting the voting power of the prisoners’ 
home communities.
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There are upsides and downsides to redrawing district lines frequently. On the 
one hand, especially when the population is mobile, frequent redrawing makes 
it easier to tailor district lines as communities change shape. This may, in turn, 
make it easier for legislators to stay connected to the communities they repre-
sent. And if new population estimates are used when the lines are redrawn, it 
will also be easier to keep districts roughly the same size. 
On the other hand, the ability to redraw districts as the population shifts will 
exaggerate the impact of drawing the lines. If districts are generally drawn to 
benefit a particular set of legislators or a particular political party, frequent 
redrawing lets the people with the pen tweak the lines repeatedly to address 
threats or opportunities in an upcoming election, and lock in their advantage. 
Frequent redrawing also means that constituents may be shuffled in and out 
of districts without the chance to hold their legislators accountable from one 
election to the next. 
WHEN ARE THE LINES REDRAWN?
REDRAWING STATE  
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
{ ONCE PER DECADE
{ AT ANY TImE
{ UNCLEAR
{ NO LAW
REDRAWING CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICTS
{	ONCE PER DECADE
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{ NO LAW
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IV. WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
Each state decides for itself – usually in the state constitution – who will draw 
district lines for its Congressmembers and for its state legislators.31 And states 
have chosen many different ways to draw these lines. Though Congress is 
given the constitutional power to pass a federal law regulating the process in a 
uniform fashion nationwide for congressional district lines (and though several 
bills have been proposed), it has not yet done so.32 
Most states put the power to draw district lines solely in the hands of the state 
legislature. This means that state legislators pass laws to create the boundaries  
for their own districts and for the state’s Congressmembers. These laws are 
usually just like any other law, but sometimes involve a few special procedures. 
And usually, the governor can veto these laws – subject to an override by the 
legislature – just like any other law.33 
In 22 states, entities other than the legislature, often called “commissions,” may 
take part in the redistricting process. These commissions vary substantially 
from state to state, but even here, in nearly all instances, legislators have a say 
at some point in how their districts will be drawn.
Four states have advisory commissions to help draw lines for the state legislative 
districts.34 (Ohio uses an advisory commission for its congressional lines.)35 
Advisory commissions recommend district plans to the legislature, but the 
legislature has the final say. The commissions vary widely. For example: 
 •  New York’s advisory commission has 6 members chosen by the majority 
and minority leaders of the legislature; some commissioners will also be 
legislators themselves. The way the commission is structured, there might 
be 4 Democrats and 2 Republicans, or 2 Democrats and 4 Republicans, 
or 3 of each, depending on partisan control of the legislature.36 
 •  Maine’s advisory commission has 15 members, with the legislative  
leadership and party chairs choosing some commission members, and 
those members choosing other members from the public. The structure  
is set up so that there will most always be an equal number from each 
major party, with one tiebreaker acceptable to both parties.37 
 •  Iowa’s advisory commission has a nonpartisan professional staff, advised 
by a five-member group appointed by the legislative leadership. There is 
an especially strong tradition of abiding by the commission’s recommen-
dations in Iowa; in fact, the legislature has to vote down two different 
plans proposed by the advisory commission before it can implement a 
plan of its own.38 
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
The legislature draws district lines in most 
states. Some states have an advisory com-
mission to suggest lines to the legislature; 
others use a backup commission in case the 
legislature can’t come to an agreement. Still 
others give all power to a commission – either 
a politician commission that can include 
legislators, or an independent commission 
where legislators don’t have a vote.
In the figures below, blue and red represent 
partisan commissioners; orange represents 
commissioners chosen by members of both 
parties. Outline circles will not be current  
legislators; solid circles may be anyone.
IOWA
MAINE
NEW YORK
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Five states instead use a backup commission for their state legislative districts 
(Connecticut uses a backup commission for congressional districts as well, and 
Indiana uses a backup commission only for its congressional districts).39 These 
backup commissions will step in to draw plans, but only if the legislature cannot  
agree on a districting plan in a timely fashion. Connecticut increases the chance  
that this backup commission will be called into action, by barring plans from 
the legislature without 2/3 support in each chamber.40 Other states with backup  
commissions vary in other respects. For example: 
 •  In Oregon, for example, the backup “commission” is really just the state’s 
Secretary of State, who will draw the legislative districts if the legislature 
cannot come to an agreement.41
 •  Texas’s backup commission is made up of the Lieutenant Governor, the  
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Attorney General, the 
Comptroller of Public Accounts, and the Commissioner of the General 
Land Office – all of which are elected partisan posts.42
 •  In Illinois, the backup commission has 8 members chosen by the legislative 
leadership (half will be legislators, half not). If necessary, one tiebreaker 
is chosen at random from two names submitted by the Supreme Court, 
each nominee from a different political party.43
Still other states have commissions that do almost all of the work. Here too, 
the commissions look very different in different states. 
At least for state legislative districts, seven states use what we’ll call “politician 
commissions”: either legislators or other elected officials can sit on the  
commission, but the legislature as a whole isn’t involved.44 Just as with the 
other structures above, each state is slightly different: 
 •  In Arkansas, the commission is made up of the Governor, the Secretary 
of State, and the Attorney General.45
 •  In Colorado, the commission has 4 members picked by the legislative 
leaders, 3 picked by the Governor, and 4 picked by the Chief Justice of 
the Colorado Supreme Court. No more than six commissioners can be 
members of the same party, and no more than four can be legislators.46 
 •  In New Jersey, each major party’s state chair selects five commissioners. 
If these ten commissioners cannot agree on a plan by a set deadline, the 
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court appoints a tiebreaker.47
 •  In Missouri, the lines for each house of the legislature are drawn by a 
separate commission. The commission drawing lines for the Missouri 
state house has 18 members; the parties each nominate two members 
from each congressional district, and the Governor picks one from each 
party for each district. The commission drawing lines for the Missouri 
state senate has 10 members; each party nominates ten members, and the 
Governor picks five from each party. Redistricting plans pass only if they 
have support from 70% of the commissioners.48
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ILLINOIS
TEXAS
MISSOURI STATE HOUSE
NEW JERSEY
COLORADO
ARKANSAS
OREGON
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Finally, four states draw their congressional districts using independent  
commissions of five or six members of the public, largely chosen by the  
legislative leadership, but who are not themselves legislators or other public  
officials.49 (Alaska has the same system for its state legislative districts,  
but has only one congressional district, and has no set rules for drawing  
congressional district lines.) This means that for the most part, legislators 
may have a role in picking the commissioners, but will not be able to pick the 
district lines themselves. As with the other examples above, there are several 
different models of independent commission. In Arizona, for example, four 
commissioners are selected by the legislative leadership, but they may only be 
chosen from a pool of nominees selected by the state’s commission on appellate 
court appointments; those four commissioners then select a fifth tiebreaker 
of a different party or no party at all, by majority vote.50 Washington has an 
independent commission chosen by the legislative leadership, but also lets 
the legislature tweak lines at the end of the process; once the commission has 
drawn a plan, if the legislature gets a 2/3 vote in each house, it can change the 
commission’s plan on the margins – but only 2% of the population in any 
given district may be affected by such a legislative change.51 
The summary above describes who currently draws the lines in each state. But 
as varied as these models are, there are still more possibilities. Some involve 
variants of the processes above. For example, one recent proposal would have 
established a commission of retired judges, chosen randomly from a pool 
nominated by legislative leaders (judges now draw the lines in many circumstances 
when other bodies fail to do so properly).52 Another proposal would ask  
established non-legislative state bodies to nominate potential commissioners, 
and give legislative leaders a veto before choosing the commissioners themselves  
at random. 
Other proposals are more radical departures from the status quo. Some have 
suggested letting computers draw the lines using automated algorithms. Some 
would allow members of the public to submit plans to be judged purely on 
quantitative criteria, like the plan that splits the fewest counties or the plan  
that creates the most competition (see below). Some have proposed citizen 
commissions selected by random lot.53 Still others have put forth combinations 
of various pieces of the ideas above.
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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CHOICES INFLUENCING WHO  
DRAWS THE LINES
Because the possibilities are virtually endless, it may help to think about the 
different ways of deciding who draws the lines by breaking the choices down 
into a few broad categories:
ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE
Most states allow the legislature full control over the process of drawing lines 
from beginning to end. Some give the legislature first crack only. Some give others 
the first crack but allow the legislature the final word. Some (like Washington) 
let the legislature tinker only at the edges, changing districts set by others in 
minor ways. And some give no role to the legislature at all. 
Giving the legislature a role has some pros and cons. Legislators, whose election  
depends on knowing their constituents, are particularly aware of where specific 
constituent communities are located in a geographic area; they may choose to 
use this knowledge to tailor districts so that those constituencies are adequately 
represented. Also, because legislators are elected, they are at least in theory 
directly accountable to the public in the event that district lines become 
controversial. (On the other hand, one of the ways in which legislators may 
use their redistricting power is to dilute the political voice of the groups most 
likely to oppose particular redistricting decisions.) Moreover, because there are 
always tradeoffs involved in drawing district lines, it may make sense to let the 
legislature – which has to confront tradeoffs constantly – handle the job, rather 
than creating a whole new institution to hammer out compromise. 
Critics, however, point out that no other country allows self-interested legislators  
to draw the lines of the districts in which they run for office.54 When the  
legislature is involved in drawing lines, the lines are more likely to overemphasize  
the interests of the party in control of the legislature, at least if the Governor 
is friendly or the legislature can override a veto. Moreover, when the legislature 
draws the lines, the lines are also more likely to emphasize the interests of some 
(or in some cases, all) incumbent legislators in getting re-elected. Because 
legislators who stay in office longer get more seniority, and are able to do more 
for their constituents, some people consider self-interested redistricting a good 
thing; because these same legislators may break up real communities in order 
to build districts more likely to re-elect them, many consider it a detriment. 
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
It is useful to consider the following factors in 
deciding who draws the lines:
 • Role of the legislature
 • Role of individual legislators
 • Partisanship
 • Voting rule
 • Size
 • Diversity 
 • Role of the courts
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ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS
By giving the legislature control of drawing the lines, most states necessarily 
involve legislators directly in the process. Some states move control to “politician  
commissions,” where the legislature as a whole is not involved, but a few 
elected officials – usually legislative party leaders – become members of  
the commission. Arkansas gives control not to legislators, but to elected  
executive officials. 
A few states have “independent commissions”; though elected public officials 
in these states are not themselves permitted to become commissioners, they 
are responsible for appointing commission members, and often select political 
insiders. Arizona limits this discretion by creating a nominee pool; though the 
legislative leadership chooses four of the five commissioners, they must make 
their selections from a pool of 25 nominees chosen by the state’s bipartisan 
commission responsible for nominating appellate judges.55 
The states with independent commissions also use other mechanisms to limit 
legislators’ ties to those drawing the lines. All have some sort of forward-looking 
rule, preventing commissioners from running for office in the districts that they  
draw, at least for a few years after they draw the lines.56 Idaho and Washington 
also look backward, preventing recent lobbyists from becoming commissioners.57  
Still other proposals would buttress the wall between legislators and those who 
draw the lines by declaring commissioner positions off-limits to relatives of 
legislators, or to recent staffers or consultants for legislators. A recent California 
proposal adds a further prohibition on those who have recently contributed 
more than a given amount to a candidate’s campaign.58 
Involving individual legislators – or allowing individual legislators to involve 
their staff or confidants, either as commissioners or as technical consultants 
for a commission – has many of the same effects as involving the legislature as 
a whole. Legislators may know their constituent communities especially well, 
and ensure that they are adequately represented. Individual legislators may also 
seek to preserve their own jobs, trying to draw the lines so that it is easier for 
them and harder for any promising challenger to win an election. When party 
leaders rather than individual legislators are involved, they may seek to serve 
the interests of their party’s legislators, or they may try to boost party fortunes, 
even at the expense of individual members of the legislature.
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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PARTISANSHIP
In some states, the redistricting process may be set up to allow one political  
party to take control. For example, this may happen when the legislature draws 
the lines and one party controls the Governor’s office and both houses of the 
legislature. Similarly, some commissions have an odd number of partisan 
members, putting one party effectively in charge. Illinois begins with an even 
number of members from each major party, but chooses a tiebreaker randomly, 
which lets one party ultimately take control.59 
In other states, the process is designed to be bipartisan, as when an equal number 
of people from each major party sit on a commission; to get a majority, at least 
one commissioner from each party must vote for a particular plan.60 In some cases,  
a commission consists of an equal number from each major party plus a tiebreaker  
either appointed by the judiciary,61 or selected by the partisan commissioners 
themselves.62 In Arizona, the tiebreaker must not be registered with any party 
already represented among commissioners chosen by the legislative leadership.63 
There are also other ideas that are not yet in place in any state. Some of these 
proposals would create multipartisan commissions, with commissioners from 
third parties or who are not registered with any major party, in addition to 
Democrats and Republicans.64 And some proposals would not let anyone  
registered with a political party draw the district lines.
Each of these models or proposals has its critics. Allowing one political party to 
control the process of drawing the lines can lead to a plan that tries to maximize  
that party’s seats in the state legislature or in Congress, or make as many seats 
as possible “safe” for one party, at the expense of supporters of opposing parties.  
On the other hand, a process designed to be bipartisan or multipartisan may 
ratify bipartisan or incumbent protection gerrymanders, or allow the minority  
party or parties to draw lines that make it easier to win more seats than other-
wise justified by their level of support. And critics are very skeptical of purported  
nonpartisans; they say that aiming for a nonpartisan process either involves people  
who don’t know enough about political communities to make reasoned choices,  
or gives people with hidden partisan preferences – whether commissioners or 
the consultants or technicians who serve as staff to a commission – license to 
act under the radar. 
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VOTING RULE
In most states, a redistricting plan can pass if it wins a simple majority of the 
votes of the people drawing the lines. Some states, however, require a super-
majority: more than just over half.65 In Maine, a plan needs 2/3 of the votes to 
pass; in Missouri, it needs 70%.66 In Connecticut, a backup commission will 
draw the lines if a plan does not get 2/3 of the votes in the legislature.67 These 
sorts of supermajority requirements tend to produce broad compromise plans, 
because they give an effective veto to a small number of members. If legislators 
are themselves involved in drawing the district lines, this structure may lead to 
a compromise decision to just maintain the existing lines, or tweak the districts 
so that incumbent legislators have an easier chance to win their elections. 
SIzE
Redistricting bodies range in size from 424 legislators in New Hampshire to 
just three executive officials in Arkansas. The more people who are involved, 
the more opportunity there is to make sure that those drawing the lines reflect 
the diversity of the state. However, involving more people also makes it harder 
to come to a consensus on where the lines should be drawn.
DIVERSITY
Because district lines make it more likely that certain interests will be represented  
and others ignored, many forms of diversity are relevant in deciding who draws 
the lines – including geographic, ethnic, racial, and partisan diversity. When 
the legislature is in charge of drawing the lines, those with the pen will at least 
be as diverse as the legislative majority. When commissions draw the lines, 
though, some states have extra rules to make sure that the commission is 
diverse. As discussed above, several states try to ensure that their commissions 
have a balance of partisan members. Other states may require that one or  
two commissioners be chosen from each of several geographic regions.68 Still 
other proposals (not yet in place in any state) ask those who are picking the 
commissioners to make sure that the commissioners reflect the racial or ethnic 
diversity of the state. 
In general, the more the body drawing the lines represents the diversity of the 
state itself, the more likely it is that the final district plan will fairly balance 
the various interests and communities in the state – though diversity on the 
redistricting body itself is no guarantee that the final plan will represent diverse 
interests.69 On the other hand, the more diverse the membership, the harder it 
may be to come to a consensus on where the lines should be drawn. 
WHO REDRAWS THE LINES?
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ROLE OF THE COURTS
In a few states, a judicial official has some say in determining who draws the  
legislative lines. In Mississippi, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is  
him- or herself a member of the five-person backup commission that draws  
the lines if the legislature cannot agree on a plan.70 In Alaska, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court appoints one of the state’s five commissioners; in  
Colorado, the Chief Justice appoints four of the eleven commissioners.71 And 
in New Jersey, if the ten appointed bipartisan commissioners cannot agree on  
a plan, the Chief Justice will appoint a tiebreaker.72 
Judges have little direct stake in the contours of particular legislative district 
lines, and may appoint individuals who similarly have little direct stake in the  
outcome of the redistricting process. Some judges, however, have more distinct  
loyalties. Particularly in states where judges are elected in partisan contests  
or have strong partisan ties, there may be pressure to use the redistricting or 
appointment power to further particular partisan ends. 
Such inclinations may also be factors when the courts are called upon to draw 
district lines, when the regular process breaks down. Legislatures deadlock 
and can’t come to an agreement. Commissions draw lines that are illegal and 
need to be revised in a hurry. Many times, those who feel they have “lost” in a 
redistricting plan will try to convince a court that the plan is illegal, and some-
times they are right. At that point, because of an upcoming election or because 
the primary line-drawers have proven incapable, the court may have to draw 
district lines itself.73 Since 2000, courts have drawn district lines for at least one 
legislative chamber in at least eleven states.74 As mentioned above, these may 
have partisan impact as well; studies have shown that judges who supervise the 
drawing of lines often adopt plans that favor the political party with which 
they identify.75 
A few states provide for automatic review of any redistricting plan by the state’s 
supreme court.76 Such a rule generally speeds up the resolution of any conflict, 
though it is always possible that further litigation in federal court will follow.  
Moreover, these provisions also have their detractors: again, where judges 
have more pronounced partisan leanings, these loyalties may influence court 
decisions on a redistricting plan just as surely as they may influence the state 
legislature. And even if the courts do not actually draw the lines, the prospect 
of a judicial decision favoring one party may be used as a bargaining weapon 
by legislators or commission members from that party.
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COMMISSIONS USED TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS 1
WHO SELECTS COMMISSIONERS 
Governor	selects	2		::		Legislative	majority	leaders	
select	1	each		::		Chief	Justice	selects	1	
	
Commission	on	appellate	court	appointments	
nominates	25	(10	from	each	major	party,	5	from	
neither	major	party)		::		Legislative	majority	and	
minority	leaders	select	1	each		::		Those	4	commis-
sioners	select	1	tiebreaker	not	registered	with	party	
of	any	of	4	commissioners	
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
1	each		::		Governor	selects	3		::		Chief	Justice	
selects	4
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders		
select	2	each		::		Those	8	commissioners	select		
1	tiebreaker
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
2	each		::		6	of	those	8	commissioners	agree	on		
1	tiebreaker
	
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select	
1	each		::		State	party	chairs	of	two	major	parties	
select	1	each
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
1	legislator	and	1	non-legislator	each		::		Tiebreaker	
chosen	if	necessary	by	random	draw	from	2	names		
(1	of	each	party)	submitted	by	Supreme	Court
Senate	majority	and	minority	leaders	select	2	each		
::			House	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
3	each		::		State	party	chairs	of	two	major	parties		
select	1	each		::		Those	7	commissioners	select	1	
each	from	the	public		::		Those	7	“public”	commis-
sioners	select	1	tiebreaker
House:	each	major	party	nominates	2	per		
congressional	district		::		Governor	chooses		
1	per	party	per	district	(for	9	districts)
Senate:	each	major	party	nominates	10		::			
Governor	chooses	5	per	party
OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON  
COMMISSIONERS 
1	commissioner	from	each	of	4	judicial	districts			
::			Cannot	be	public	employee	or	official		::				
Cannot	use	party	affiliation	to	select	commissioner
	
At	most	2	commissioners	from	the	same	party			
::		At	most	2	of	first	4	commissioners	from	same	
county		::		No	public	office	for	3	years	before		
appointment		::		Cannot	have	switched	party	in		
last	3	years	
	
At	most	6	commissioners	from	the	same	party	
::		At	most	4	can	be	members	of	state	assembly		::			
At	least	1	/at	most	4	from	each	congressional	district
Must	be	elector	of	state	
	
None	
	
	
Must	be	registered	voter	in	state		::		Not	lobbyist	
for	1	year	before	appointment		::		Not	official/can-
didate	for	2	years	before
At	most	4	commissioners	from	the	same	party	
	
	
None	
	
	
	
	
House:	at	most	1	nominee	from	each	state		
legislative	district	within	each	congressional	
district
Senate:	none	
  STRUCTURE 
ak	 	Independent	
Commission	
ar	 	Politician	
Commission
az	 	Independent	
Commission	
	
	
co	 	Politician	
Commission	
ct	 	Backup		
Commission	
hi		 	Politician	
Commission	
ia		 	Advisory		
Commission
id		 	Independent	
Commission	
il		 	Backup	
Commission	
	
me	 	Advisory	
Commission	
	
	
	
mo	 	Politician	
Commission	
	
	
ms	 	Backup		
Commission
YEAR  SIZE 
 
1998	 	 5	
	
1936	 	 3	
2000	 	 5	
	
	
	
1974	 	 11	
	
1976	 	 9	
	
1968	 	 9
	 	 	
	
1980	 	 Bureau	
1994	 	 6	
	
1980	 	 8	(9	if	tie)	
	
	
1975	 	 15	
	
	
	
	
1966	 	 House:	18	
	 	 	 Senate:	10	
	
	
1977	 	 5
Governor,	Secretary	of	State,	Attorney	General	are	the	commissioners
1
	 	In	the	other	states	not	represented	in	the	chart,	the	legislature	draws	the	district	lines.	If	the	legislature	cannot	agree	on	a	plan,	the	Governor	will	draw	the	lines		
in	Maryland;	the	Secretary	of	State	will	draw	the	lines	in	Oregon;	and	the	process	elsewhere	is	left	to	the	courts.
Nonpartisan	bureau	draws	lines	for	legislature	to	approve
Chief	Justice,	Attorney	General,	Secretary	of	State,	and	the	legislative	majority	leaders		
are	the	commissioners
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COMMISSIONS USED TO DRAW STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS (cont’d) 1
WHO SELECTS  
COMMISSIONERS
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select	1	
each		::		Those	4	commissioners	select	1	tiebreaker
Each	major	party	chooses	5		::		Tiebreaker	chosen		
if	necessary	by	Chief	Justice
Legislative	majority	leaders	select	1	legislator,		
1	non-legislator	each		::		Legislative	minority		
leaders	select	1	each
	
	
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
1	each		::		Those	4	commissioners	select	1	tiebreaker
Legislative	majority	leaders	select	3	legislators,		
3	non-legislators	each		::		Legislative	minority		
leaders	select	2	legislators	each
	
Chief	Justice	selects	1		::		Governor	selects	1	from	
each	major	party		::		Each	major	party	selects	1
Legislative	majority	and	minority	leaders	select		
1	each		::		Those	4	commissioners	select		
1	nonvoting	chair
OTHER RESTRICTIONS 
ON COMMISSIONERS
2	commissioners	from	west	counties,	2	from		
east		::		Cannot	be	public	official	at	the	time
Selectors	must	“give	due	consideration”	to		
representation	of	geographical	areas	of	state
None	
	
	
	
	
	
Tiebreaker	cannot	be	current	public	official	
None	
	
	
Gubernatorial	and	party	appointees	must	be	
resident	of	state	for	last	5	years
Must	be	registered	voter		::		Not	lobbyist	for		
1	year	or	official/candidate	for	2	years	before		
appointment
	 	 STRUCTURE 
mt	 	Independent	
Commission
nj	 	Politician	
Commission
ny	 	Advisory	
Commission	
oh	 	Politician	
Commission
ok	 	Backup	
Commission
pa	 	Politician	
Commission
ri		 	Advisory	
Commission	
tx	 	Backup	
Commission
vt	 	Advisory	
Commission
wa	 	Independent	
Commission
YEAR  SIZE 
1972	 	 5	
1966	 	 10	(11	if	tie)	
	 	 	 6	
	
1967	 	 5	
1964	 	 3	
1968	 	 5	
2001	 	 16	
	
1948	 	 5	
1965	 	 5	
1982	 	 5
Governor,	State	Auditor,	Secretary	of	State	are	the	commissioners		::			
Each	major	party’s	legislative	leaders	select	1	other	commissioner
Attorney	General,	Superintendent	of	Public	Instruction,	State	Treasurer	are	the	commissioners
Lt.	Governor,	Attorney	General,	Comptroller	of	Public	Accounts,	Commissioner	of	the	General	Land		
Office,	and	the	House	majority	leader	are	the	commissioners
1
	 	In	the	other	states	not	represented	in	the	chart,	the	legislature	draws	the	district	lines.	If	the	legislature	cannot	agree	on	a	plan,	the	Governor	will	draw	the	lines		
in	Maryland;	the	Secretary	of	State	will	draw	the	lines	in	Oregon;	and	the	process	elsewhere	is	left	to	the	courts.
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE  
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ak		 Independent	Commission	
al		 Legislature
ar		 Politician	Commission
az		 Independent	Commission	
ca		 Legislature	
co		 Politician	Commission
ct		 Backup	Commission	
	
	
de		 Legislature	
	
fl		 Legislature	
ga		 Legislature
hi		 Politician	Commission	
ia		 Advisory	Commission	
id		 Independent	Commission	
il		 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
	
in		 Legislature	
	
ks		 Legislature
ky		 Legislature		
	
la		 Legislature
  GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN?
	 No	
	 Yes
	 No
	 No
	 Yes
	 No
	 No	
	
	
	 Yes	
	
	 No
	 Yes
	 No
	 Yes	
	 No
	 Yes	
	
	
	
	
	 Yes	
	
	 Yes
	 Yes	
	
	 Yes
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PARTISAN CONTROL
Democrat
2
Democrat
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democrat
Democrat
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	bipartisan	
backup	commission	drew	lines*
Democratic	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,	
Republican	House
Republican
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,	
Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
Democratic	backup	commission	
drew	lines*
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House
Republican
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
STATE SUPREME  
COURT REVIEW
If	citizen	asks
If	citizen	asks
Automatic
If	registered	voter	asks	
	
	
	
	
Automatic
If	registered	voter	asks
If	qualified	elector	asks	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Automatic
2
	 	Control	by	one	party	or	another	does	not	guarantee	a	partisan	result,	and	bipartisan	control	does	not	preclude	a	result	biased	in	favor	of	one	party	or	another.		
This	table	lists	only	the	inputs	into	the	process.
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES (cont’d)
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE  
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
ma		 Legislature	
md		 Legislature
me		 Advisory	Commission	
	
	
mi		 Legislature
mn		 Legislature	
	
	
	
mo		 Politician	Commission	
	
ms		 Backup	Commission
mt		 Independent	Commission
nc		 Legislature
nd		 Legislature
ne		 Legislature	
nh		 Legislature	
	
	
nj		 Politician	Commission
nm		 Legislature	
	
	
nv		 Legislature	
	
ny		 Advisory	Commission
  GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN? 
	 Yes		
	 No
	 Yes	
	
	
	 Yes
	 Yes	
	
	
	
	 No	
	
	 No
	 No
	 No
	 Yes
	 Yes	
	 Yes	
	
	
	 No
	 Yes	
	
	
	 Yes	
	
	 Yes
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PARTISAN CONTROL
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Democrat
Independent	Governor,		
split	Senate,	Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement	on	Senate	
districts,	court	drew	lines*
Republican
Independence	Party	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Bipartisan		::		no	commission		
agreement,	backup	judicial		
commission	drew	lines*
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democrat
Republican
Republican	Governor,	
Nonpartisan	Legislature
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican
3
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	for	House	districts	
vetoed,	court	drew	lines*
Republican	Governor,		
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	Assembly
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	Assembly
STATE SUPREME  
COURT REVIEW
If	registered	voter	asks	
If	citizen	asks	
	
	
If	qualified	elector	asks
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
If	citizen	asks
3
	 	Although	the	commission’s	tiebreaker,	Professor	Larry	Bartels,	was	selected	by	the	state	supreme	court’s	Republican	Chief	Justice,	Professor	Bartels	was	not		
affiliated	with	either	major	party,	and	announced	that	he	would	vote	based	on	criteria	designed	to	foster	partisan	balance.	Sam	Hirsch,	Unpacking	Page	v.	Bartels,	1		
Election L.J.	7,	9-11	(2002).
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES (cont’d)
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE  
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
oh		 Politician	Commission
ok		 Backup	Commission	
or	 Legislature	
	
	
	
pa		 Politician	Commission
ri		 Advisory	Commission
4 
sc		 Legislature	
	
	
sd		 Legislature
tn		 Legislature	
tx	 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
	
ut		 Legislature
va		 Legislature
vt		 Advisory	Commission	
	
wa		 Independent	Commission	
wi		 Legislature	
	
	
	
wv		 Legislature
wy		 Legislature
  GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN?
	 No
	 Yes	
	 Yes	
	
	
	
	 No
	 Yes	
	 Yes	
	
	
	 Yes
	 Yes	
	 Yes	
	
	
	
	
	 Yes
	 Yes
	 Yes	
	
	 No	
	 Yes	
	
	
	
	 Yes
	 Yes
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PARTISAN CONTROL
Republican
Republican	Governor,		
Democratic	Legislature
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
Democratic	Secretary	of		
State	drew	lines*
Bipartisan
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
Republican	backup	commission	
drew	lines*
Republican
Republican
Democratic	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	House
Bipartisan	
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	Assembly		::			
no	legislative	agreement,		
court	drew	lines*
Democrat
Republican
STATE SUPREME  
COURT REVIEW
On	request
If	qualified	elector	asks	
If	qualified	elector	asks	
	
	
	
If	aggrieved	person	asks
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
If	5	or	more	electors	ask	
	
Automatic	if	plan	is	late,		
or	if	registered	voter	asks
4
	 	In	2001,	Rhode	Island	created	an	advisory	commission	to	assist	with	the	particularly	sensitive	task	of	redistricting	an	assembly	that	had	been	“downsized”	from		
50	Senators	and	100	Representatives	to	38	Senators	and	75	Representatives.	It	is	not	clear	whether	this	advisory	commission	will	be	utilized	again	in	the	future.		
See	2001 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 315;	Parella	v.	Montalbano,	899 A.2d	1226	(R.I.	2006).
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS	
ak		 Independent	Commission
al		 Legislature
ar		 Politician	Commission	
az		 Independent	Commission
ca		 Legislature
co		 Politician	Commission	
	
	
	
ct		 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
de		 Legislature
fl		 Legislature
ga		 Legislature
hi		 Politician	Commission
ia		 Advisory	Commission	
id		 Independent	Commission
il		 Backup	Commission	
	
in		 Legislature	
	
	
	
	
ks	 Legislature
  STRUCTURE FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICTS
	 1	congressional	district
	 Legislature
	 Legislature	
	 Independent	Commission
	 Legislature
	 Legislature	
	
	
	
	 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
	 1	congressional	district
	 Legislature
	 Legislature
	 Politician	Commission
	 Advisory	Commission	
	 Independent	Commission
	 Legislature	
	
	 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
	
	 Legislature
GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN? 
n/a
Yes
Yes	
No
Yes
Yes	
	
	
	
No	
	
	
	
n/a
Yes
Yes
No
Yes	
No
Yes	
	
Yes	
	
	
	
	
Yes
001 CYCLE PARTISAN  
CONTROL FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
n/a
Democrat
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Bipartisan
Democrat
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
bipartisan	backup	commission		
drew	lines*
n/a
Republican
Democrat
Bipartisan
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
Democratic	backup	commission
5
	
drew	lines*
Republican
5
	 	In	Indiana,	when	the	legislature	cannot	agree,	congressional	lines	are	drawn	by	a	five-person	backup	commission	composed	of	the	majority	leader	and		
the	chair	of	the	apportionment	committee	in	each	legislative	chamber,	and	a	member	of	the	assembly	appointed	by	the	Governor.	In	2001,	there	were		
three	Democrats	and	two	Republicans	on	the	commission.	See	Ind. Code § 3-3-2-2;	Mary	Beth	Schneider,	Panel	Adopts	New	Congressional	Maps,		
Indianapolis Star,	May	11,	2001.
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES (cont’d)
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS	
ky		 Legislature	
	
la		 Legislature	
ma		 Legislature	
	
md		 Legislature
me		 Advisory	Commission	
	
	
mi		 Legislature
mn		 Legislature	
	
	
	
mo		 Politician	Commission	
	
ms		 Backup	Commission	
	
mt		 Independent	Commission
nc		 Legislature
nd		 Legislature
ne		 Legislature	
nh		 Legislature	
nj		 Politician	Commission
nm		 Legislature
  STRUCTURE FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICTS
	 Legislature	
	
	 Legislature	
	 Legislature	
	
	 Legislature
	 Advisory	Commission	
	
	
	 Legislature
	 Legislature	
	
	
	
	 Legislature	
	
	 Legislature	
	
	 1	congressional	district
	 Legislature
	 1	congressional	district
	 Legislature	
	 Legislature	
	 Politician	Commission
6
 
Legislature
GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN? 
Yes	
	
Yes	
Yes	
	
Yes
Yes	
	
	
Yes
Yes	
	
	
	
Yes	
	
Yes	
	
n/a
No
n/a
Yes	
Yes	
No
Yes
001 CYCLE PARTISAN  
CONTROL FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature	
(veto	overridden)
Democrat
Independent	Governor,	
split	Senate,	Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican
Independence	Party	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House
Democrat		::			
no	legislative	agreement,		
court	drew	lines*
n/a
Democrat
n/a
Republican	Governor,			
nonpartisan	Legislature
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature
Bipartisan
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
court	drew	lines*
6
	 	New	Jersey	uses	a	different	politician	commission	for	its	congressional	districts:	the	majority	and	minority	leaders	and	the	major	state	party	chairs	select		
2	commissioners	each	(none	of	whom	may	be	a	member	or	employee	of	Congress),	and	those	12	commissioners	select	a	tiebreaker	by	majority	vote.		
N.J. Const. art.	II, § 2,	¶	1.
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS:  WHO DRAWS THE LINES (cont’d)
   STRUCTURE FOR STATE 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS	
nv	 Legislature	
	
ny		 Advisory	Commission	
	
oh		 Politician	Commission
ok	 Backup	Commission	
	
	
or		 Legislature	
	
	
pa		 Politician	Commission
ri		 Advisory	Commission
8 
sc		 Legislature	
	
	
sd		 Legislature
tn		 Legislature	
tx	 Backup	Commission	
	
	
	
ut		 Legislature
va		 Legislature
vt		 Advisory	Commission
wa		 Independent	Commission
wi		 Legislature	
	
wv		 Legislature
wy		 Legislature
  STRUCTURE FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICTS
	 Legislature	
	
	 Advisory	Commission	
	
	 Advisory	Commission
	 Legislature	
	
	
	 Legislature	
	
	
	 Legislature
	 Advisory	Commission	
	 Legislature	
	
	
	 1	congressional	district
	 Legislature	
	 Legislature	
	
	
	
	 Legislature
	 Legislature
	 1	congressional	district
	 Independent	Commission
	 Legislature	
	
	 Legislature
	 1	congressional	district
GOVERNOR CAN  
VETO PLAN? 
Yes	
	
Yes	
	
Yes
Yes	
	
	
Yes	
	
	
Yes
Yes	
Yes	
	
	
n/a
Yes	
Yes	
	
	
	
Yes
Yes
n/a
No
Yes	
	
Yes
n/a
001 CYCLE PARTISAN  
CONTROL FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
Republican	Governor,		
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	Assembly
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	Assembly
Republican
7
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Democratic	Governor,	
Republican	Legislature		::			
legislative	plan	vetoed,	
court	drew	lines*
n/a
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Legislature
Republican	Governor,	
Republican	Senate,		
Democratic	House		::			
no	legislative	agreement,	
court	drew	lines*
Republican
Republican
n/a
Bipartisan
Republican	Governor,	
Democratic	Senate,		
Republican	Assembly
Democrat
n/a
7
	 	When	Ohio’s	congressional	redistricting	took	longer	than	expected,	the	legislature	had	to	pull	together	a	2/3	majority	to	pass	the	plan	as	an	emergency	bill,		
which	would	take	effect	in	time	to	avoid	an	expensive	supplemental	primary	for	congressional	seats	alone.	See	Lee	Leonard,	Redistricting	Compromise	Reached,	
columbus dispatch,	Jan.	18,	2002.
8  
This	advisory	commission	was	created	to	assist	with	redistricting	given	a	reduction	in	the	overall	size	of	the	legislature.	It	is	not	clear	whether	this	advisory		
commission	will	be	utilized	again	in	the	future.	See	the	description	above	in	the	table	of	state	legislative	redistricting	structures.
*	 	In	these	states,	the	primary	decision	maker	did	not	agree	on	district	lines	before	the	state’s	deadline.	In	some	cases,	a	backup	commission	drew	the	lines;	in	other	
cases,	a	court	took	over.
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V. HOW SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
Institutions that seem similar may draw lines using very different processes, 
and emerge with very different results.
STARTING POINT
A decision as simple as where to start drawing – from the southeastern corner of a  
state, for example, or from the northwest, or from the center – can substantially  
impact the final contours of the district lines. In most states, those drawing 
new lines start with the existing districts. Some, instead, start the map by  
drawing around minority communities, because of the priority of the federal  
Voting Rights Act (see below). Others start with a relatively regular box-like 
grid, and adjust as necessary.77 
TIMING
The redistricting process always has one eye on the clock. The census distributes  
redistricting data to the states no later than April 1 of the first year of a decade: 
1991, 2001, 2011, and so on.78 In most states, districts must be redrawn for 
the next election; pragmatically, this means that district lines must be set, at 
the latest, by the filing deadline for the state’s primary election, in the spring or 
summer of the decade’s second year: 1992, 2002, 2012, etc.79 
The vast majority of states actually set themselves deadlines far earlier than the 
candidate filing date. Most also set up interim time limits for different stages 
of the process: a proposed plan by X date, hearings by Y date, a final plan by 
Z date, usually anticipating the likelihood of litigation after a plan is passed. 
Some states with advisory bodies or commissions that draw the lines will get a 
head start by establishing those bodies, and picking commissioners, well before 
the census data arrives in April.80 
If the clock runs out, a court or backup commission or elected official – depending  
on the state – will be charged with drawing district lines that reflect the new 
population counts. In order to ensure enough time to act, these institutions 
will usually begin the process of collecting data and reviewing potential plans 
well before the deadline for the primary decisionmaker.
The amount of time that each state devotes to each part of the redistricting 
process can affect the resulting district lines. For example, states that allow 
relatively little time for the primary redistricting body to negotiate over various 
proposals may be more prone to deadlock, leaving responsibility for the final 
district lines to the courts or other backup institutions. In states with more 
time, on the other hand, public hearings may reveal unintended consequences 
of a particular proposal, and allow the primary redistricting body to adjust the 
map accordingly.
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TRANSPARENCY
In some states, only a few insiders have a meaningful chance to get involved with  
drawing the district lines. They may be on a committee within the legislature, 
or a technical advisory group, or one of the commissions discussed above.  
Decisions are made in secret, with little opportunity for those outside the room 
to have input into the district lines, or the communities that end up represented. 
Other states open the process to the public. In 2002, at least 26 states made 
demographic or political data available and accessible, and at least 18 provided 
public access to computers or redistricting software that might otherwise cost 
thousands of dollars.81 Many states hold public hearings.82 They may accept  
potential maps from the public.83 They may even publish proposed district 
lines and take specific feedback from the community. 
Other proposals would go one step further, requiring that decisions be made 
entirely in the public eye. In these proposals, aside from conversations with 
their own staff or individual fellow commissioners, redistricting conversation 
would not be permitted behind closed doors.84 All comments would have to  
be “on the record,” for public distribution either at the time or after the maps 
are released.
Still other proposals take a different approach to transparency, allowing those 
drawing the lines to conduct business in secret, but forcing them to publicly 
justify the lines that they draw. They would have to produce a report at the end 
of the process, explaining why the districts were drawn as they were. That report  
would not only inform the public, but would also serve as contemporaneous  
evidence of the intent of the redistricting body in the event of a future  
court challenge.
Like the other variables, transparency has its tradeoffs. In the extreme, it can  
be hard to make politically unpalatable decisions if each step along the way 
is publicized in real-time. And though allowing the public to submit plans 
or forcing a body to justify its decisions in public need not interfere with the 
operation of a redistricting body, both require time that must be allocated in  
a busy redistricting season.
On the other hand, secrecy often breeds distrust, and may cause citizens to  
assume the worst about the motives of those drawing the lines. Moreover, 
members of the public are likely to know more about the effect of certain 
district configurations on local communities than legislators or commissioners 
who may be concentrating on the redistricting plan as a whole. Public comment  
is the best means to ensure that those who draw the lines get the best information 
on the impact of their choices.
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RELATED TOPICS: The Role of Technology
Given more than a few competing objectives, it 
is difficult to program a computer to draw district  
lines on its own – but in the right hands, computers  
are still extremely useful redistricting tools. 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) soft-
ware assigns political and demographic data  
to points or regions of maps, and will allow 
even less experienced users to draw district 
lines on-screen with instant feedback about  
the composition of the district. 
Several packages are commercially available; 
some states will make data for these packages 
available over the Internet, so that private  
parties can plan districts just as the states do.
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DISCRETION AND CONSTRAINT
Finally, a practical note on discretion and constraint. As discussed below,  
different states have different legal rules for where the lines can be drawn.  
The more constraints there are, and the less discretion the line-drawers have, 
the less important it may be to choose one set of line-drawers over another. 
Some people want to make the rules on where to draw the lines so tight that one  
plan is the clear mathematical “winner.” Some even advocate for programming 
a computer to draw the lines, though there are serious practical difficulties in 
doing so while trying to reconcile multiple objectives.85 
Those who find intuitive appeal in an automated approach often point to the 
fact that automation limits the likelihood that maps will be manipulated by 
a few actors at the expense of others. “Automated,” however, does not mean 
“neutral.” Voters’ homes are not randomly located across the countryside. 
Many of the rules susceptible to automated application have predictable 
consequences for the sorts of legislators likely to be elected.86 For example, in 
1969, districts for the Hinds County Board of Supervisors in Mississippi were 
ostensibly drawn to equalize road and bridge mileage within each district; the 
resulting plan had the effect of splintering the African-American urban core of 
the county, in the state capitol, Jackson.87 
Moreover, many of the more familiar “mathematical” rules – like district  
shape and keeping counties intact and the like – are proxies for trying to keep 
together groups that people perceive as coherent communities. The tighter 
those rules are, the less flexibility there will be to adjust when a community 
doesn’t stick to an ideal pattern. 
Finally, even a computer has to be programmed, with rules deciding which 
constraints take priority over others. There is no way to avoid the hard work 
of balancing the tradeoffs involved in drawing district lines – the decision 
whether it is more important to draw districts that try to do X or that try to  
do Y. And that also means there is no way to avoid the hard work of deciding 
who should decide.
Because discretion can be abused, some 
have suggested eliminating discretion. But 
such tight constraints are rarely “neutral,” 
and often have predictable, and potentially 
undesirable, effects.
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Except for rare cases, congressional districts 
must have almost exactly the same popula-
tion. In contrast, the biggest and smallest 
state legislative districts can generally have 
a population difference of up to 10%. 
VI. WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
The people who draw district lines cannot simply divide a state up however 
they wish. To some extent, the federal Constitution and federal statutes limit 
where the lines can be drawn. In most states, the state constitution also imposes  
certain limits. And even when there are few legal limits, those with the pen 
use certain principles to guide where the lines should be drawn, each of which 
has its own tradeoffs. We next discuss the criteria that states must and may 
consider when redrawing their districts.
EQUAL POPULATION
For much of the 18th, 19th, and even 20th centuries, most legislative districts  
were made up of whole towns or counties, or groups of counties.88 As the 
population shifted, however, some counties grew much larger than others 
– and accordingly, some legislative districts grew much larger than others. By 
the 1960s, for example, the biggest district in California (Los Angeles County) 
had 422 times as many people as the smallest district.89 
In some cases, each district – each county – would be assigned a different 
number of legislative representatives, depending roughly on its population. In 
other cases, each district elected only one legislator. The population disparities 
quickly became extreme – and in the bigger districts, each individual vote was 
worth less. In California’s state senate, for example, each district elected one 
Senator. And as a result, the vote of each citizen in the smallest district was 
worth 422 times more than the vote of each citizen in Los Angeles County.
In a series of cases starting in 1962 known as the “one person, one vote” cases, 
the Supreme Court decided this sort of disparity violated the Constitution. Now, 
when districts are drawn, each district’s population must be roughly equal.90 
There are two different standards for “equal” population in congressional 
districts and state legislative districts. In 1964, the Supreme Court set the bar 
for congressional districts very high, requiring equal population “as nearly as is 
practicable.”91 In practice, this means that states must make a good-faith effort 
to have absolute mathematical equality for each district within the state, and 
any differences must be specifically justified.92 
For state legislative districts, the Supreme Court has allowed a bit more flexibility. 
These districts have to show only “substantial equality of population.”93 The 
Supreme Court has never said exactly how much equality is “substantial” 
equality. Over a series of cases, however, it has become generally accepted that 
the population difference between the largest and smallest state legislative  
districts (the “total deviation”) may not be more than 10% of the average  
district population.94 This is not an absolutely hard line: in some cases, a state 
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States consider some or all of the following 
criteria when deciding where the lines should 
be drawn:
 • Equal population
 • Voting Rights Act 
 • Contiguity
 • Compactness
 • Political boundaries
 • Communities of interest
 • Electoral outcomes
RELATED TOPICS: Measure of Population
Each Congressional district’s population is 
based on the total number of residents, including 
children, noncitizens, and others not eligible  
to vote. 
For state legislative districts, however, the 
law is less settled: most states count the total 
population, but some have proposed using  
voting-age population (“VAP”) or citizen  
voting-age population (“CVAP”). 
These latter measures tend to equalize the 
voting power of each ballot, but leave many 
taxpaying residents under-represented.
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may have a compelling reason for drawing districts with more than 10%  
population disparity,95 and in some cases, a state’s reasons may not be good 
enough to justify population disparities that are less than 10%.96 But 10% 
seems to be a generally accepted federal constitutional benchmark.
A few states have gone beyond these federal limits. Some restrict the overall total  
disparity, to prevent particularly big or particularly small districts: Colorado, 
for example, says that there can be no more than a 5% difference between the 
biggest district and the smallest district,97 and in Minnesota, the maximum 
deviation is 2%.98 Iowa both limits the maximum deviation to 5% and says 
that the average deviation must be less than 1%, keeping all districts closer to 
the “ideal” population.99 
Still other standards have been proposed but have not yet been put in place. 
For example, one standard would require groups of districts to reflect the  
appropriate proportion of the state population as a whole: 10% of the districts 
should have about 10% of the population, 20% of the districts should have 
about 20% of the population, and so on.100 This measure allows flexibility for 
an individual district or two, while making sure that no substantial region of 
the state is systematically underpopulated or overpopulated.
Like all of the other criteria below, there are pros and cons to equal population 
rules more rigid than the constitutional requirements. Rigid equal population  
rules ensure that each person has the same representation as every other person. 
Because population is easy to measure, rigid equal population rules also limit 
the discretion of people who are drawing the lines in ways that are easily enforced 
by courts. 
On the other hand, rigid equal population rules can force districts to cut up 
communities: if every district must be exactly the same size, a district may have 
to carve out part of a town or county or neighborhood. Rigid equal population 
rules can also cause districts to look strange, with lines drawn in irregular  
ways to exclude or include a particular number of people. Finally, rigid equal 
population rules can make it harder to draw districts that give minority citizens 
real opportunity to elect representatives of their choice; for example, in some 
cases, minority citizens may live in pockets that would make it possible for 
them to elect minority representatives in districts that are slightly smaller than 
average, but that would essentially make it impossible for them to do so in  
full-size districts.
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CALCULATING EQUAL POPULATION
 DISTRICT # POPULATION DEVIATION
 1  1,010  + 1.0 % 
 2  1,035  + 3.5 % 
 3  980  - 2.0 % 
 4  940  - 6.0 % 
 5  1,005  + 0.5 % 
 6  990  - 1.0 % 
 7  965  - 3.5 % 
 8  1,020  + 2.0 % 
 9  1,050  + 5.0 % 
 10  995  - 0.5 %
Total	population: 10,000 
Average	(“ideal”)	population:  1,000 
Average	deviation: 2.5 % 
Total	deviation:  11.0 %
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MINORITY REPRESENTATION
The extent to which redistricting can account for race is a particularly delicate 
legal balance: essentially, states must account for race in some ways, but may not  
do so “too much.” The Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution 
to require a particularly compelling reason before a state can make the race of 
citizens the “predominant” reason for drawing particular district lines.101 And 
the Court has also repeatedly implied that one such compelling reason is the 
use of race to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act.102 
The Voting Rights Act was passed by Congress and signed by President Lyndon 
Johnson in 1965. As federal law, the Voting Rights Act overrides inconsistent 
state laws or practices, just like the federal constitutional equal population 
requirement overrides inconsistent state laws. 
The Voting Rights Act was designed primarily to combat discrimination and 
intimidation that were used to deny African Americans and other minorities 
the right to an effective vote. And it has had a tremendous impact. The graph 
at right shows the number of African-American federal and state legislators 
elected, growing from 99 when the Act was passed to 650 today.103 And including 
local offices, there are today more than 9,000 African-American elected officials, 
about 5,000 Latino or Hispanic public officials, and far more Asian Pacific 
American and Native American officials than ever before.104 
Some parts of the Voting Rights Act are permanent, and some are set to expire 
unless they are renewed periodically. Two sections of the Voting Rights Act are 
particularly relevant to redrawing district lines: section 2 (which is permanent) 
and section 5 (which was last renewed in 2006).105 
SECTION 2
Section 2 prohibits any voting practice or procedure that results in the “denial 
or abridgement” of anyone’s right to vote based on race, color, or minority  
language status.106 In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to clarify that, specifically, 
it prohibited laws or practices that denied minority voters an equal opportunity 
“to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice.”107 A violation of this type is sometimes called “vote dilution.” 
Many states had an ignominious history of using the redistricting process to 
dilute the vote of minority communities. In some cases, they would splinter a 
single community among many majority-white districts to eliminate minority  
voting power; in other cases, with larger minority populations, they would 
pack as many minority votes as possible into one district, to minimize the 
number of seats that minorities could control.108 
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RELATED TOPICS: Race and the Census
In 2000, the Census expanded the way in 
which it accounted for an individual’s racial 
identity, by allowing a respondent to check 
multiple categories indicating her race or 
ethnicity. 
Before 2000, redistricting data contained 9 
racial and ethnic categories; now, there are 126 
distinct categories to consider. In 2001, the 
Department of Justice explained that it would 
usually consider individuals with a multi-racial 
identity as belonging to each indicated minority 
group for Voting Rights Act purposes. Thus, a  
voter checking both Black and White would be  
tallied with the Black population when analyzing 
minority voting opportunities; a voter checking 
both Hispanic and Black would be tallied with 
both Hispanic and Black populations when 
analyzing minority voting opportunities. 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LEGISLATORS
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Section 2 requires states to draw districts 
where minorities have the opportunity to elect 
a candidate of their choice if there is:
 1. Large, compact minority population
 2. Politically cohesive minority voting
 3.  Politically cohesive majority voting 
defeating minority candidates
    +
  Totality of the circumstances showing 
diminished minority voting power
In majority-minority districts, the majority of 
the voters are from the same minority racial 
or ethnic group. Some also include districts in 
which more than 50% of the voters are from 
two or more different minority groups, par-
ticularly if the different groups tend to vote in 
a similar pattern.
In minority opportunity districts, minorities 
have the opportunity to elect a representative 
of their choice. These are usually majority-
minority districts, but in minority coalition 
districts, minority voters might comprise less 
than 50% of the district, and still elect their 
chosen representatives with support from 
some “crossover” white voters. 
In minority influence districts, minorities 
constitute a sizable portion of the district, 
but cannot control the result of an election. 
There is substantial debate about the extent 
to which minority voters actually influence 
policy in such districts.
Section 2 provides some relief from such tactics. It gives voters the right to  
turn to the courts if, for example, a district could be drawn to give a minority 
community the opportunity to elect its candidate of choice, but the district 
lines instead split the community up into separate districts where its voting 
power is diluted. When litigants challenge a redistricting plan or part of a plan 
under Section 2, asserting that districts could be drawn to preserve minority 
voting power that is otherwise diluted, they must first show that: 
 •  a minority population is sufficiently geographically compact (that is, living 
close together) that it would make sense to draw a district containing it;109 
 •  the minority population (usually, the citizen voting-age minority population)  
is sufficiently large that it would have the opportunity to elect the candidate  
of its choice if it voted together; 
 •  the minority population is “politically cohesive” – that is, that it usually 
votes for the same candidate; and 
 •  the majority population usually votes for a different candidate, so that 
the majority population is usually able to defeat the minority-preferred 
candidate.110 
When minority voters and majority voters reliably vote for different candidates,  
voting is said to be “racially polarized.”
If those attacking the plan can show that all of these conditions are satisfied, 
the court will then consider the “totality of circumstances”: the total context 
in the state, including the extent of historical discrimination in voting and in 
other areas, and the extent to which minorities have been able to elect their 
chosen candidates anyway.111 In the past, courts have paid particular attention to 
the proportion of districts controlled by minorities, compared to the minority 
percentage of the population – investigating, for example, whether a minority 
group with 10% of the population controls 10% of the districts.112 If the court 
finds that, given the total state context, the power of the minority vote has 
been diminished, it may demand that a district be drawn to give the minority 
population the opportunity to elect a representative of its choice. Such districts 
are often known as “minority opportunity districts,” or “majority-minority  
districts,” because minorities in such districts will usually constitute the majority  
of the voters. These districts do not guarantee that minority-preferred candidates  
will be elected, but they are drawn so that if the minority population all votes 
together, their candidate – who may or may not be a member of a racial or 
ethnic minority group – will usually win.113 
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SECTION 5
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act also addresses discrimination, but works a 
little differently.114 It targets specific states and localities – “covered” jurisdictions –  
that historically erected barriers to the franchise for African Americans and other 
minorities. In particular, Section 5 targets areas that had low levels of voter 
registration or participation – much of which was tied to disenfranchisement of 
minority voters – in 1964, 1968, or 1972. After ten years of steps to improve 
opportunities for minority voting, a covered jurisdiction may ask the federal 
court in Washington, D.C. to be released from Section 5, in a procedure 
known as “bailout.”115 
For those areas still covered by section 5, the Voting Rights Act requires federal 
approval, either from the Department of Justice or from the federal court in 
Washington, D.C., before any change to a voting procedure may take effect. 
This covers changes as small as one or two new polling places and as big as new 
registration requirements for every voter in the state. It also covers changes to 
district lines. This process is called “preclearance.”
New district plans will be precleared if they (1) are not intended to dilute racial 
and language minority votes, and (2) leave racial and language minority voters 
no worse off than they were before the redistricting, using old district lines 
but new population data.116 Under section 5, minority losses in one region of a 
covered jurisdiction may be compensated by gains elsewhere, but if minority 
populations have fewer opportunities to elect candidates of choice, the new 
districts will not be approved.117 
Other than drawing districts in order to comply with section 2 or section 5  
of the Voting Rights Act, the courts have not clarified exactly when a state  
may take the race of voters into account for drawing district lines. If race is  
the “predominant” reason for the shape of a district – something the courts 
generally assess by looking at how irregular the district’s shape is, and then 
trying to figure out whether other factors better explain the irregular shape118 
– then the use of race must be precisely tailored to meet a goal that the courts 
will find “compelling.” There have been relatively few attempts to test the 
scope of this standard in the redistricting context.119 If race is simply thrown in 
the mix with other factors in drawing the lines, courts may be more forgiving, 
but again, there have been few clear rules deciding how much is too much. 
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Section 5 requires areas with historically 
low registration or voting rates to clear new 
district lines with the Department of Justice or 
the Washington, D.C. federal court. The new 
lines must leave minority voters no worse off 
than before.
SECTION 5 OF THE  
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
{	COVERED
{  PARTIALLY  
COVERED
See	Appendix	B	for	more	detail.
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RELATED TOPICS: Cumulative Voting
In the most familiar American elections, voters 
make an either/or choice for one representative 
per district, and the candidate with the most  
total votes (the pluralty) is the exclusive winner. 
An alternative to this system is cumulatve 
votng: several representatives are elected 
from the same district, and a voter has multiple 
votes, which she may give all to one candidate, 
or spread among several candidates.
Many corporations use a system like this. 
Illinois once used this method to elect its state 
representatives, but changed the rules in  
1980. Cumulative voting is still used in some 
local communities, like Peoria, Illinois and 
Amarillo, Texas.
STATE VOTING RIGHTS ACTS
Several states offer protection for minorities that is based on, but not tied 
directly to, the federal Voting Rights Act. These states generally prohibit  
drawing districts with “the purpose [ ] or the effect of diluting minority  
voting strength.”120 
California’s state voting rights act is perhaps the most clearly articulated of 
these provisions.121 As compared to its federal counterpart, the California law 
simplifies the proof for vote dilution: minority voters need only show that 
voting in the jurisdiction is racially polarized, and that the polarized voting 
has interfered with their ability either to elect candidates of their choice or to 
influence the outcome of an election.122 The California law also protects the 
voting rights of geographically dispersed minorities, perhaps even beyond the 
protections offered by the federal Voting Rights Act.123 
The California Voting Rights Act applies to “at large” multi-member elections, 
where the voters elect several officeholders from the same district. Consider a 
city council election where all voters in the city can vote to fill three different 
seats; each voter casts one vote for each seat (three votes total), and the top three  
candidates win. Even if the city is one-third minority voters, if voting is “racially  
polarized” – if minority voters and majority voters reliably vote for different 
candidates – the majority population should consistently be able to beat the 
minority voters for all three seats. 
If the minority population is sufficiently geographically concentrated, both 
the California law and the federal Voting Rights Act would probably force 
the city to divide up into three districts, with enough minority voters in one 
district to give them the opportunity to elect at least one city council candidate 
of their choice. But if the minority population is too spread out, some courts 
have been hesitant to apply the federal Voting Rights Act as a solution. This is 
where the California law steps in: it requires the city to remedy the harm, even 
if individual districts are not the most appropriate solution. If, for example, 
the city elected council members with a different voting rule, like cumulative 
voting – where each voter can cast three votes, however she likes (e.g., one vote 
for each of 3 candidates, or all 3 votes for one candidate) – the minority voters 
should be able to combine their voting strength on one candidate to have an 
opportunity to elect that candidate to at least one seat on the city council.
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EFFECT OF VOTING RIGHTS ACTS, 
100 MINORITY / 00 MAJORITY VOTERS
 AT-LARGE                      (1	VOTE	PER	SEAT) 
  SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3 
	 Majority 200 200 200 
	 Minority 100 100 100
 DISTRICTS             (VRA)	(1	VOTE	TOTAL) 
  SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3 
	 Majority 35 80 85 
	 Minority 65 20 15
 VOTING RULE         (CVRA)(3	VOTES	EACH) 
  SEAT 1 SEAT 2 SEAT 3 
	 Majority 200 200 200 
	 Minority 300 0 0
CUMULATIVE BALLOT
YOU MAY OFFER UP TO  VOTES
	 	 	1  2  3	
	 Joe	Smith	 	
	 Henry	Ford	 {	 { 	
	 Jane	Doe	 	
	 Mary	Hill	 {
RESULTS 
2	votes	for	Ford,	1	vote	for	Hill
A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING4
CONTIGUITY
Although not required by the federal Constitution or federal statute, contiguity 
is one of several redistricting principles considered “traditional” by the Supreme 
Court124 – though scholars have questioned the extent to which such principles 
were actually followed historically.125 
A contiguous district is simply a district where you can travel from any point 
in the district to any other point in the district without crossing the district 
boundary. Put differently, a contiguous district is a district where all parts of 
the district are connected to each other. 
Water creates a special case for contiguity. Most people consider districts divided  
by a waterway to be contiguous if a bridge runs across the water; island districts 
are generally contiguous as long as the island is part of the same district as the 
closest mainland, as in Washington’s 2nd Congressional District. In Hawaii, 
where there is no mainland to consider, the state constitution prohibits the 
drawing of “canoe districts” – districts that are spread across more than one major 
island group, where you need a “canoe” to travel between different parts of the 
district – unless the federal equal population requirements require combining 
two or more islands in a single district.126 
Sometimes, though, states use water as an excuse to fudge what it means for 
parts of the district to be “connected.” New York’s Congressional District 12, 
for example, is only barely contiguous: the portions of the district in Manhattan  
are connected to the portions in Brooklyn and Queens, as many island districts 
are connected to larger land masses, by three bridges and numerous subway 
lines – but the portions of the district in Manhattan are connected to each other 
only by 900 feet of a single highway. And those drawing the lines didn’t even 
pretend to connect the pieces of New York’s state Senate district 60, or the two 
halves of New Jersey’s congressional district 13.
Sometimes city or town boundaries are not contiguous; this is often a product 
of annexations. This can, in turn, create non-contiguous legislative districts: 
Wisconsin’s 61st assembly district, for example, is not contiguous, because it 
is drawn around portions of the city of Racine, which has a non-contiguous 
boundary. 
Contiguity is one of the most common rules for drawing district lines. And to 
the extent that American districts generally represent geographic communities,  
it makes sense that no part of a district should be geographically separated from 
any other. On the other hand, it may be easier to represent communities that 
are not defined by geography – for example, voters of a certain race or political  
affiliation – by forming districts out of discrete pieces of a state, even when 
they are not contiguous.
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
WI ASSEMBLY 1
RACINE
WA CONGRESSIONAL 
NY SENATE 0
NJ CONGRESSIONAL 1
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 49
COMPACTNESS
Compactness has also been recognized as a “traditional” redistricting principle, 
though by many measures, districts were not, in the past, reliably compact.127 
Compactness is the only common rule for drawing a district that directly  
addresses the district’s geometric shape. A district is generally considered  
compact if it has a fairly regular shape, with constituents all living relatively 
near to each other. A district shaped like a circle is very compact; a district  
with tendrils reaching far across a state is not. 
Beyond that I-know-it-when-I-see-it definition, there is little agreement about 
when a district is compact. Experts have proposed more than thirty different 
mathematical formulas to measure exactly how compact a district is.128 
One set of compactness measures focuses on contorted boundaries: a district 
with smoother boundaries will be more compact, one with more squiggly 
boundaries will be less compact. Technically, these measures generally measure 
either the district’s perimeter, the district’s area as compared to the district’s 
perimeter,129 or the district’s area as compared to the area of a circle with the 
same perimeter as the district (the “Polsby-Popper” test).130 It may be easier to 
picture the last measure, currently used in Arizona,131 by imagining a loop of 
string that follows the boundaries of a district, and then pushing that string out 
into a circle; the compactness formula compares the area of the district to the 
area of the circle.
Another set of measures focuses on the district’s “dispersion,” or how spread 
out it is: a district with few pieces sticking out from the center will be more 
compact, a district with pieces sticking out farther from the district’s center  
will be less compact. There are a few versions of those formulas. One formula 
compares the district’s height at its highest part to its width at its widest part. 
(Using this measure, if the district were rotated, it might have a different score.)  
Another formula compares the district’s area to the area of the smallest circle 
(the “Reock” test)132 or polygon that can be drawn around it. 
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COmPACT NOT COmPACT
POLSBY-POPPER MEASURE
SOME MEASURES OF DISPERSION
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Still another set of measures compares the district’s shape to its population 
“center of gravity”: looking at where the population in a district lives, a district  
with its population center close to its geographic center will be more compact, 
and a district where the centers are farther away will be less compact.133 In the 
figure to the right, the geographic center and the population center of the district 
on the left are in the same place. In the district on the right, however, the “city” 
in the northeastern corner shifts the population center away from the geographic  
center, giving it a slightly lower compactness score than the first district. 
No single measure is uniformly “best” at identifying what we think of as compact 
districts, or at distinguishing less compact lines in low-population areas from 
those that twist and turn to carve up population centers. For example, most 
people think that the 1992 map for Florida Congressional district 3 is not 
compact. A compactness measurement focusing on boundaries would fit with 
that intuition. However, some measurements focusing on dispersion (like  
overall width v. overall height) would say that the district was, against our 
expectation, relatively compact. Measures focusing on boundaries, in contrast, 
may not fit our intuition for districts that are very long and thin but smooth.
Most states that require compactness gloss over the different measurements by 
requiring that districts be “compact,” without further explanation. A few states 
actually specify how compactness should be measured. In Iowa, for example, 
districts should be evaluated either by a measure comparing length and width, 
or by a measure comparing total district perimeter.134 In Colorado, plans are 
also measured using district perimeter length, aggregated for all districts.135 In 
Arizona, districts are measured using the Polsby-Popper test, comparing the 
district’s area to the area of a circle with the same perimeter.136 In Michigan,  
districts are measured using a variant of the Reock test, based on a circle drawn 
around the district.137 
Whatever the measure, a focus on compactness – as with other criteria – has 
benefits and detriments. Preferring compact districts is based on the idea that 
people who live close to one another will likely form a community worthy of 
representation, with shared characteristics and common interests. (Indeed, the 
Supreme Court seems to have established a presumption that despite some 
shared characteristics, voters of the same race who live far from each other  
are not particularly likely to have race-based common interests that are worth 
representing.)138 Compact districts may also make it easier for candidates 
– especially candidates for local office – to campaign on the ground, without 
having to travel great distances from one end of the district to another.139 
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
FLORIDA CONGRESSIONAL  
DISTRICT ,  199
SOURCE: ELECTION	DATA	SERVICES,	INC.
POPULATION CENTER OF GRAVITY
	GEOGRAPHIC  
 CENTER
 POPULATION 
 CENTER
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 51
On the other hand, because compactness measures usually prefer regular geometric 
shapes like circles, emphasizing compactness is likely to cause districts to cut 
through communities that do not evolve in neat geometric patterns – including 
not just town boundaries, which often squirm in irregular ways140 – but also 
communities of racial or ethnic minorities. Compact districts may not accom-
modate natural features like mountain ranges or rivers that disperse communities  
or cause them to meander. Depending on how the population is spread 
throughout a state, and the particular measure of compactness, it may also be 
very difficult to create compact districts that also have roughly equal population. 
And unless voters with different political preferences are very well integrated, 
requiring a district to be compact may limit a state’s flexibility to draw competitive 
districts with voters of balanced partisan preferences.141 Rather, especially if  
voters favoring one party tend to cluster in geographically small areas like 
urban centers, compact districts may “pack” these voters in and dilute their 
voting strength (see below).142 
If trying to maximize each district’s compactness gets in the way of these 
other criteria, one potential way to reconcile the tradeoffs is to set a particular 
compactness threshold. It is possible to use most compactness measures to 
give a particular district, or a particular plan, a numerical score. But as with 
the population equality standards discussed above, rather than pushing for the 
highest or lowest possible score in every case, some proposals would simply 
say that each district must be at least as compact as some threshold X. Other 
proposals would add or average the compactness scores for each district, so that 
the plan as a whole would be at least as compact as X, but individual districts 
could vary substantially. 
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Compactness requirements can either embrace 
or carve up communities, depending on how 
spread out the particular voters are.
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POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES 
In addition to contiguity and compactness, the Supreme Court has also  
expressly recognized respect for political “subdivisions” of a state (like counties, 
towns, or wards) and respect for communities defined by shared interests  
as “traditional” redistricting principles.143 Indeed, in most states, following 
political subdivisions was the first explicit rule for drawing district lines: before 
the Supreme Court required population equality in the 1960s, most states 
simply assigned representatives to counties or groups of counties, so that each 
district precisely followed county boundaries. Even after the population equality 
decisions, many state constitutions have kept this preference for preserving 
county boundaries where possible, or for splitting no more than a certain number  
of counties overall.
In other states, the principle has been extended: preserve counties when  
possible; if you must split a county, preserve townships; if you must split a 
township, preserve municipalities, then city wards, then individual voting  
precincts. Sometimes these political units are given preference in a different 
order. Depending on the layout of cities and townships in a particular state, 
the order may be significant: preserving the boundaries of Franklin County’s 
townships (highlighted in the figure on the right) forces a set of choices quite 
different from preserving the county’s municipal boundaries, represented by 
the gray spaces in the center.
A small part of the reason for drawing district lines to preserve political boundaries 
is that voting precincts are usually wholly within a political boundary, and it is 
moderately less burdensome for election administrators if all election contests 
are the same within one precinct.144 Another part of the reason for preserving  
political boundaries is that the extent to which district lines maintain these 
boundaries can be objectively measured, which provides an enforceable standard 
to reign in the twists and turns of gerrymanders. A third reason is that state 
legislators elected from districts comprising whole towns or cities may be more 
responsive to particular local needs.145 But most of the reason is that political 
boundaries – especially counties and cities – are presumed to be fairly neutral,  
fairly good proxies for groups of people who share a common interest. When 
we talk about the fact that a particular legislator is from Detroit, or Des Moines,  
or San Francisco, we have an idea, right or wrong, about the kinds of people 
she might represent and the kinds of policies she might favor.
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Of course, political boundaries do not neatly represent all shared interests.  
If communities of racial or ethnic minorities cross town or county lines, a  
district that follows political boundaries may slice up these communities. And 
just as with compactness, drawing districts along town or county lines may 
limit a state’s flexibility to draw competitive districts with voters of balanced 
partisan preferences. Rather, especially if voters favoring one party tend to 
cluster in particular cities or counties, districts that follow political lines may 
“pack” these voters in and dilute their voting strength (see below).146 
In addition to or instead of political boundaries, some states place a priority 
on drawing lines that conform to geographic boundaries: mountain ranges, 
significant rivers, prominent lakes or other bodies of water, and the like. These 
limitations are sometimes phrased in terms of facilitating candidates’ ability to 
get around: Maine, for example, seeks to “minimiz[e] impediments to travel 
within the district, . . . [which] include, but are not limited to, physical features 
such as mountains, rivers, oceans and discontinued roads or lack of roads.”147 
Emphasizing geographic boundaries has some of the same benefits and limitations 
as discussed above with respect to political boundaries. Often, these geographic 
boundaries divide the population into different communities. Where they 
do not, following the boundaries may fragment the communities of interest. 
Following geographic boundaries may also yield districts that are less compact. 
And as with each other constraint, following geographic boundaries in rigid 
fashion leaves less flexibility to accomplish other objectives.
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COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST 
In a few states, those drawing the lines are explicitly asked not just to follow the  
political boundaries that are proxies for pockets of people with shared interests,  
but to preserve communities of interest directly, even if they spread over county  
or city lines. A community of interest is a group of people concentrated in 
a geographic area who share similar interests and priorities – whether social, 
cultural, ethnic, economic, religious, or political.148 
Some people believe that it is best to keep communities of interest whole, so 
that each community of interest can have a chance to have its own legislator 
looking out for its interest in the legislature, and so that individual legislators 
feel particularly responsible to serve the discrete communities as communities.  
Others believe that it is best to split communities of interest up so that districts 
are more heterogeneous and each legislator must compromise to suit her  
constituents. There are also instances when a sizable community, like a city 
dominant in its region, may want to be split into two or more districts, in order  
to extend its influence in the legislature. Which answer is the right answer  
depends entirely on what you think representative districts should accomplish.149 
In any event, even if your philosophy of representation defines preserving 
communities of interest as the ultimate substantive goal of all redistricting, that 
standard nevertheless has some limits. First, as clear and objective as political  
boundaries may be, communities of interest are notoriously fuzzy, because 
shared interests may be either vague or specific, and because people both move 
locations and change their interests over time. This fuzziness makes it fairly 
easy to manipulate district lines while claiming that the lines are drawn to 
embrace a particular community. (Some have proposed reducing the fuzziness 
somewhat by preventing district lines from dividing census tracts: geographical  
regions defined by the U.S. Census, usually with between 2,500 and 8,000 
people, that generally share the same demographic characteristics, economic 
status, and living conditions.)150 
Preserving communities of interest may also make it more difficult to ensure 
strict population equality, if different communities are different sizes within a 
state – or to keep districts optimally compact, if the communities are scattered 
or spread out. And again, though shared political interests may well have their 
own community, preserving communities of interest other than communities  
of like-minded partisans may make it more difficult to draw competitive  
districts with voters of balanced partisan preferences. 
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ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
In addition to using the constitutional, statutory, and “traditional” principles 
above, district lines are drawn in many states with an eye to their likely electoral  
impact. Every set of lines has a predictable electoral impact. In some cases, 
however, it is apparent that the electoral impact of the lines – particularly the 
partisan impact – was the primary reason for drawing the lines as they are.
PARTISANSHIP
Partisan redistricting occurs when the people drawing the lines estimate that 
voters in a certain area are more or less likely to vote for a Democrat, Republican, 
or third-party candidate (or not to vote at all), and then group voters together in 
districts to increase the chance that candidates from a preferred party are elected.
The calculation that voters in a certain area will probably vote for a certain  
party’s candidate are guesses – but they are very, very, very well-informed guesses.  
In many states, when voters register, they can declare their party affiliation; 
it is usually possible to find out how many people have registered with which 
parties, at least by county and often by precinct. Even more reliable are past 
election returns: although election officials don’t record whom each voter voted 
for, they do compile results for each candidate in each precinct. If 67% of your  
precinct voted for President Bush, there’s a 67% chance that you voted for 
President Bush.151 And adding up the election results for many candidates over 
time means that it’s usually possible to estimate the partisan preference of a 
given precinct, on average. Research has shown that these estimates are both 
relatively accurate and relatively stable over time.152 
Those in control of redistricting may try to use these estimates to help candidates 
of one party or another, by drawing districts that make it easier for that party 
to win. When an entire redistricting plan is designed to make it easier for one 
party to win elections, it is known as a partisan gerrymander. It is not surprising 
to find that partisan gerrymanders occur most often when one political party 
completely controls the redistricting process.
The basic techniques of creating a partisan gerrymander are cracking, packing,  
and tacking.153 Cracking is the act of dividing groups of people with the same 
characteristics – in this case, voters likely to vote for a particular party – into 
more than one district. With their voting strength divided, the group is more 
likely to lose elections. 
For example, imagine a state with 10 legislative districts and 1,000 voters,  
narrowly split between the two major parties: 520 registered Democrats and 
480 registered Republicans. The Republican voters make up 48% of the  
state as a whole. But if the districts are drawn to divide up (or “crack”) the 
Republican voters so that there are 48 Republicans (and 52 Democrats) in each 
and every district, the Republicans are likely to lose all ten legislative races. 
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Every set of district lines has a predictable 
electoral impact.
“CRACKING”
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Packing is just the opposite – cramming as many people with the same  
characteristic into as few districts as possible. In these few districts, the 
“packed” group is more likely to win … but this drains their voting strength 
elsewhere. Consider the same state as above, but now imagine that the  
Republicans control the line-drawing. They might pack two districts with  
100 registered Democrats apiece, and split the remaining Democratic voters  
so that there are 40 Democrats (and 60 Republicans) in each of the other eight 
districts. The Democratic candidates will probably win two races, but they  
are likely to lose all of the rest.
Tacking is the process of reaching out from the bulk of a district to grab a 
distant area with specific desired (usually partisan) demographics. Imagine our 
same state above, with the Republicans in control, and a consolidated area of 
46 Democrats and 44 Republicans. If the Republicans can find a small portion  
of the state with 8 Republicans and only 2 Democrats, and “tack” it onto  
the consolidated area above, they will likely win the district. Tacking is also 
frequently used to add a particular politician’s home to a district in which she  
is anxious to run.
It may be easier to understand packing, cracking, and tacking through a visual 
example. The figure to the right shows a hypothetical state, with a population 
cluster near the center; though the voters are unevenly distributed, the state 
as a whole is evenly politically balanced at 40 Democrats (blue circles) and 40 
Republicans (red circles).154 Imagine that the state has to be divided into four 
districts of equal population.
As the figures to the right show, with a little creativity, it is fairly straightforward  
to “pack,” “crack,” and “tack” either Democratic or Republican voters. The  
figure on the right is a Democratic gerrymander, packing the Republicans so 
that it is likely that they win one seat, and likely that Democrats win three.  
Below that is a Republican gerrymander, with Democrats now packed and likely 
to win only one seat, and Republicans likely to win three. And farther below is 
another Republican gerrymander, with the small section of four Republicans 
at the lower right corner of the state “tacked” to the larger population in the 
lower left.
One common complaint about these gerrymanders is that prospecting for  
voters by party tends to interfere with other objectives of redistricting. For  
example, depending on where a party’s supporters live, drawing lines that 
follow party preference may lead to districts that are not compact, that cross 
political boundaries, or that carve out chunks of social or economic communities 
of interest.
Another complaint about such gerrymanders is that they distort representation 
in the state overall. With 40 voters apiece in our hypothetical state, Democrats 
and Republicans enjoy equal support statewide – but depending on the district 
lines, either party can win a disproportionate number of seats in the legislature.155 
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“TACKING”
HYPOTHETICAL  
STATE
“PACKING”
District 1 14 D  6 R 
District 2 14 D  6 R 
District 3 12 D  8 R 
District 4 0 D  20 R
DEMOCRATIC GERRYMANDER
REPUBLICAN GERRYMANDER
District 1 8 D  12 R 
District 2 20 D 0 R  
District 3 6 D  14 R 
District 4 6 D  14 R
District 1 9 D  11 R 
District 2 15 D  5 R  
District 3 8 D  12 R 
District 4 8 D  12 R
REPUBLICAN GERRYMANDER
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Some of this disproportion is the by-product of virtually any district lines, if 
a single seat is up for grabs by the candidate who wins the most votes. In this 
kind of “winner take all” system, the preferences of voters who support losing 
candidates do not translate into legislative seats, no matter how the districts are 
drawn. At best, losers in one district can hope that their preferred party wins  
by a comparable margin, in a district somewhere else in the state, to make up 
for the loss. 
Because this rarely works out exactly, there is almost always a difference between 
a party’s statewide support and the percentage of seats that it wins in an election. 
Some view this difference as a good thing, because it tends to produce legislative 
majorities that are more robust, and can therefore implement programmatic 
changes more easily. Some view it as a distortion to be avoided. Either way, it is 
to some extent an inherent part of “winner take all” elections. 
Some of the disproportion, however, has to do with the particular way the 
districts are drawn, and may end up giving an extra bonus to one party or the 
other. In the extreme, districts might be drawn so that a party with a majority 
of the votes might consistently lose the majority of seats. When the way that 
districts are drawn in a state with a rough overall partisan balance makes it 
statistically more likely that the translation from votes to seats will favor one 
particular political party consistently over time, the redistricting plan is said to 
have partisan bias.156 Some have proposed that states adopt rules to reduce the  
partisan bias of redistricting plans.157 One such method, for example, rewards maps 
to the extent they achieve balance: if one district is likely to favor Republicans 
by 10%, over and above the general statewide trend, there should be another 
district in the state that is likely to favor Democrats by 10%. Another method 
to mitigate partisan bias would keep legislative seats in reserve – not allocated 
through the districting system, but allocated statewide to parties that have 
won district seats – in order to keep the total legislative representation roughly 
proportional to the parties’ statewide support.158 
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RELATED TOPICS:  
Proportional Representation
In a system of “winner take all” districts, one 
party or another will usually win more legislative 
seats than its overall statewide support (for 
example, winning 57% of the seats with 51%  
of the vote). 
Some other countries (and some local American 
jurisdictions) forego districts, and instead use  
a system of proportonal representaton –  
where 51% support translates as nearly as 
possible to 51% of the legislative seats. Critics 
express concern that such systems give undue 
power to party insiders at the expense of voters, 
and to fringe parties at the expense of main-
stream ones. Several variants of proportional 
representation, with slightly different rules, 
may mitigate these concerns. 
Still other places mix the two systems, electing 
some representatives from districts and others  
from jurisdiction-wide lists, in a manner designed 
to approach proportional representation in  
the legislature as a whole. In America, the  
Democratic Party’s presidential primary system 
is such a mix: some delegates allocated in the 
primary process are elected proportionally 
across an entire state, and some are elected 
(also by proportional representation) within a 
“multi-member” district (see the “multi-member” 
discussion on p.65  below).
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Minimizing partisan bias through district lines would limit partisan gerrymanders, 
but it would also likely affect many other redistricting principles. In fact, most 
redistricting principles that don’t seem related to partisan outcomes have the 
potential to lead to skewed partisan results.159 In our hypothetical state, for 
example, the population cluster at the center of the state might be a minority 
population to be protected under the Voting Rights Act, or a city with boundaries  
to be preserved. As seen in the figure on the right, in this particular state creating  
a district for that population also creates a district very likely to elect a Democrat. 
Or perhaps our hypothetical state requires a map with maximum compactness. 
In this state, the result is three districts likely to elect Democrats and one likely 
to elect a Republican. Relatively small shifts in either of these district plans can 
turn any given district from “likely red” to “likely blue,” and vice versa.
These are, of course, made-up examples. But these principles will likely have a 
partisan impact in the real world as well. Indeed, election scholars have shown 
that because of broad population trends, certain redistricting principles increase 
partisan bias across the country – at the moment, in favor of the Republican  
Party.160 For example, districts created under the Voting Rights Act, with enough  
minority voting strength to elect a candidate of choice, may be drawn in urban 
neighborhoods, where heavily Democratic African-American voters live next to 
heavily Democratic urban white voters, creating extremely heavily Democratic 
districts. These districts are effectively pre-“packed” with a high concentration  
of Democratic voters. And as seen to the right, packing Democrats in one 
district leaves fewer Democratic voters to go around in other districts, which 
may make it easier overall for Republicans to win elections.161 Some think that 
compactness rules or respecting political subdivisions work the same way.162 If 
Democrats are highly concentrated in cities and Republicans are more spread 
out in suburbs, a rule that forces districts to stay compact will likely end up 
packing many Democratic voters into a few tight urban districts. This leaves 
the remaining Democratic voters spread thinly among many suburban districts, 
which become more likely to elect Republican candidates.
Whether partisan bias is the result of an intentional gerrymander or the natural 
consequence of some other principle, there appears at present to be little legal 
limitation on how partisan a plan may be. Only a few states purport to limit 
partisanship, and these limitations are seldom enforced.163 On the federal level, 
the Supreme Court has said that partisan gerrymanders may be challenged 
under the Constitution,164 but five Justices have never agreed on a standard  
for deciding how much partisanship is too much. Several blatant partisan  
gerrymanders – from both parties – have been approved by the courts,  
and no plan has yet been ruled unconstitutional because it is an excessive  
partisan gerrymander. 
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Most redistricting principles, even if they seem 
unrelated to partisanship, have the potential 
to lead to skewed partisan results.
MINORITY DISTRICT
District 1 14 D  6 R 
District 2 10 D  10 R  
District 3 16 D  4 R 
District 4 0 D  20 R
MAXIMUM COMPACTNESS
District 1 12 D  8 R 
District 2 12 D  8 R  
District 3 12 D  8 R 
District 4 4 D  16 R
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BIPARTISAN GERRYMANDERS AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION
Just as those drawing the lines may try to create districts where it will likely be 
easier for one political party to win elections, they may also try to draw districts 
so that it will likely be easier for the current incumbent – or another candidate 
of the same party – to win re-election. These bipartisan gerrymanders happen 
most often when legislators are directly involved with the redistricting process, and 
control of the process is split (for example, if the two houses of the legislature – 
or the legislature and the governor’s mansion – are controlled by two different 
parties). In these cases, the politicians may decide that if they won’t be able to 
improve their own party’s status at the expense of the opposition, they should 
just protect their own party’s seats as best they can.
Many bipartisan gerrymanders are designed specifically to protect the existing 
incumbents. As in other partisan gerrymanders, line-drawers create an incumbent 
protection gerrymander by packing partisan supporters of an incumbent into  
her district. But for an incumbent protection gerrymander, not every like-minded 
voter will do: incumbents want most to keep the same voters with whom they  
have built up name recognition and goodwill over the years. Incumbent protection 
gerrymanders, then, tend to change existing district lines as little as possible.
There is an inherent tension between the attempt to protect incumbents and 
the attempt, discussed above, to promote partisan gain. In order to increase the 
number of districts that a party is likely to win, it makes sense to spread the party’s 
supporters over the competitive districts. Put differently, to get the most gain 
for the party, it’s better to win a lot of districts, even if that means winning by 
only a few points. (Scholars have noted that overly aggressive partisan gerry-
manders may try to win too many districts by too few votes. That is, the party 
in control of the district lines may cut the likely margins so close that it ends up  
losing a number of races.) In contrast, an incumbent’s highest priority is often 
winning just one district (her own) by a great many points. Spreading supporters 
thin in order to win many seats may cause individual incumbents to feel less secure.
In practice, the degree of support for a party in any given area may make it 
possible to achieve both objectives at the same time.165 Consider, for example, 
the relatively evenly divided area at left:166 in total, 52% of the voters lean 
Republican. Before redistricting, assume that the Republicans win two districts 
out of four. It may be possible to protect these incumbents by redrawing the 
district lines to pack two districts 90% full of likely Republican voters. Most 
such districts would be considered exceedingly “safe” for Republican candidates,  
and particularly for well-known incumbents. However, if the Republican party 
in our example also wanted to further a partisan gerrymander, it could do so 
without substantially jeopardizing its incumbents. It could spread supporters 
from the “packed” districts out into other districts in order to win more seats; 
rather than a district 90% full of likely Republican voters, districts of 70%  
Republican voters would still leave the party reasonably sure that its incumbents 
would be “safe.” And that would leave enough likely Republican voters in a 
third district to give a Republican candidate a substantial advantage.
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When neither party dominates a state  
legislature, the sitting politicians can create  
a bipartisan gerrymander by packing  
districts with their own supporters.
DIFFERENT GERRYMANDERS
before redistricting
incumbent protection
“safe” partisan gerrymander
riskier gerrymander
30 - 70 45 - 55 55 - 45 62 - 38
10 - 90 10 - 90 85 - 15 87 - 13
30 - 70 30 - 70 40 - 60 92 - 8
48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52 48 - 52
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COMPETITION
The goal of both partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders is to draw district lines with  
enough likely supporters that preferred candidates will be relatively insulated 
from broader political trends – that they will be “safe.” And by and large, most 
legislators are safe, though gerrymandering is only one of several causes.167 
In 2006, for example, 38% of the partisan state legislative races were wholly 
uncontested by a candidate from one of the major parties; that is, 38% of the  
time, either a Democrat or Republican did not even bother running for the seat.168 
And in federal races, 86% of the elections for the House of Representatives 
were won by more than a 10% margin, which political scientists generally 
consider a fairly comfortable win.169 The vast majority of legislators coasted 
to victory. In response, many advocates – and in limited fashion, three states 
– have proposed rules to foster elections with robust competition. 
In the context of drawing district lines, most discussions of competition discount  
or ignore primaries, when incumbents may theoretically be kept accountable 
through challenges by members of their own party (though incumbents enjoy 
advantages that make meaningful primary competition difficult to achieve in 
practice).170 Instead, the focus is on drawing districts that make it likely that  
the general election will be close. Usually, this means trying to group voters 
so that the election returns are likely to be 55% to 45%, or closer. As in the 
gerrymanders above, line-drawers would put voters in particular districts based 
on their likely partisan preference – only in this case, they would attempt to 
balance the partisan voters evenly in a district rather than lumping all voters 
with a particular preference together. 
As with all other redistricting principles, using district lines to foster competition  
has upsides and downsides. There are several benefits of fostering competition. 
First and foremost, competitive districts appeal to our sense of fairness, at least 
in one sense: in a competitive district, a candidate from either major party 
usually has a realistic chance to win the general election. If an election is as 
much about a contest as it is about representation, the contest in a competitive 
district feels more evenhanded. Competitive districts may also foster challenges 
from more qualified candidates; many good candidates will not even try to 
contest an election in a district where the opposing party reliably wins 80%  
of the vote. 
Moreover, districts with an even partisan balance should theoretically cause 
incumbent legislators to cater more attentively to a wider range of their 
constituents, because they would be more worried that they might lose a close 
election.171 A related claim is that evenly balanced districts tend to elect more 
moderate legislators, because the candidates have to aim for the middle of  
the political spectrum to increase their chances of getting elected;172 this is an  
application of the median voter theorem, which assumes that a representative’s 
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ideology tends to track the district’s median voter. Also related is the claim that 
candidates in competitive districts will campaign with more vigor, spending 
more time and effort contacting voters and mobilizing them to vote. Finally, 
voters get excited by elections that are seen as competitive, and many assume 
that more people would vote – that turnout would be higher – if the districts 
were less slanted along party lines. 
While there is little dispute that competitive districts accomplish some of these 
objectives, there are reasons to be skeptical about their ability to accomplish 
others.173 The most important caveat is that competitive districts will not always 
produce competitive elections, at least when an incumbent is running.174 
Incumbents are usually better able to raise campaign money, better positioned 
to get on the ballot, and more widely recognized within their districts.175 Plenty 
of incumbents have run for office in competitive districts – or in districts where 
voters otherwise favor the opposing party – and have won in landslides.176 
There may also be districts where balanced partisanship does not promote 
more balanced policies. If – a big, and empirically disputed “if ” – voters are 
polarized in their partisan preferences, with little desire to cross party lines for 
particular candidates,177 candidates may choose to focus on turnout more than 
policy: encouraging opposing voters to stay home, and depending on the more 
extreme voters in the “base” to bring victory on election day. It is not clear that 
a partisan balance in the district would have much of an impact on candidates’ 
policies in such an environment – or that the increased campaign activity 
resulting from a closer race would produce better-informed voters. Finally, the 
intuition that more people vote when an election is competitive has certainly 
been demonstrated in races for President or for Governor. However, it is not 
clear whether even a high level of competition would motivate many more 
people to vote for a state representative if they weren’t going to vote anyway. 
It is also true that the impact of designing districts to encourage competition 
– just like the impact of designing districts to lock in a “safe” partisan seat, or 
the impact of designing districts to capture more transient communities –  
fades over time. Voters move in and out of districts, and parties fall relatively 
in and out of favor; though it is true that those drawing the lines can use past 
information to make a very accurate guess about voters’ partisan preferences 
next year, predictions will be much less precise for voters’ preferences eight 
years down the road. 
As with each other criterion above, there are tradeoffs involved in drawing 
competitive districts – indeed, many of the same tradeoffs involved in drawing 
the uncompetitive, or “safe,” districts described above. Depending on where a 
party’s supporters live, drawing lines that follow party preference may lead to 
districts that are not compact, that cross political boundaries, or that carve out 
chunks of real communities of common interest.178 For example, let’s return for 
a moment to our hypothetical state. The figure on the left draws district lines 
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Because of campaign finance rules, term 
limits, the natural advantages of incumbency, 
and the quality of a specific campaign, among 
other factors, competitive districts may not 
actually produce competitive elections.
MAXIMUM COMPETITION
District 1 10 D  10 R 
District 2 10 D  10 R  
District 3 10 D  10 R 
District 4 10 D  10 R
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so that an equal number of Democrats and Republicans live in each district, 
but it has to break up the population cluster at the center of the state in order 
to do so. In a real world analog, drawing a competitive district in heavily 
Democratic San Francisco would likely require crossing the Bay Bridge to the 
eastern suburbs or drawing stringy districts stretching far down the peninsula 
and into central California.
In some regions of a state, it will usually be possible to accommodate multiple 
objectives: districts that preserve minority rights, embrace other communities, 
follow political boundaries, achieve partisan balance, and so on. Attempting  
to maximize competition in each district, however – as with an attempt to 
prioritize any other single objective, exclusively, in each district statewide –  
is likely to interfere with these other objectives. Maximizing competition also 
has a different impact in a state with a deeply divided electorate than it does 
in a state that heavily favors one party or another: in the latter circumstance, 
a district designed for competition strives to grant half of the likely vote to a 
party that, for whatever reason, has rendered itself unpersuasive in the region. 
Furthermore, some observers note that the more districts in a state that are 
designed to produce competitive elections, the more chance there is to switch 
party control of the legislature from year to year. Whether this potential for  
frequent switching is “good” or “bad” is in the eye of the observer; what to 
some looks like stability, looks to others like calcification. 
Those who promote competitive districts usually do so in less extreme fashion, 
as part of a mix of objectives.179 Arizona, for example, asks those drawing the 
lines to favor competitive districts, but only after all other criteria are satisfied.180  
Another proposal would set a threshold, requiring some but not all of a state’s 
districts to be competitive. (There is no general agreement on the optimal 
number of competitive districts, or whether that number is similar for states 
that are evenly divided along partisan lines and for states that lean heavily to 
one party or another.) 
Other proposals take a different approach. Rather than fostering competition 
directly, they suggest procedures that will help thwart specific attempts to make 
districts uncompetitive. To some degree, all of the states with commissions that 
insulate legislators from the decisionmaking process have removed the single 
biggest incentive to draw lines in order to make districts uncompetitive. 
A few other states have attacked the tools rather than the motivation: these 
states prohibit line-drawers from looking at information on the past voting  
patterns of any given region, except where gauging the extent of polarized  
voting may be necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Critics respond 
that the line-drawers are usually sufficiently expert in local partisan proclivities  
to understand how to reduce competition without relying on specific data; 
a ban on voting patterns would thereby serve to blind only the public to the 
partisan impact of the redistricting decisions. 
Rather than fostering competitive districts 
directly, some proposals focus on thwarting 
deliberate attempts to make districts  
uncompetitive.
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POLITICIANS’ HOMES
In the constellation of factors used to draw district lines, politicians’ homes shine 
with special brilliance. Most states require that politicians live in the district 
they intend to represent. Therefore, the lines drawn around a politician’s home 
will determine the district in which she can run for office. In the past, district 
lines have been drawn to enfold particular blocks, or even particular houses, to 
ensure that the targeted individuals are placed in the desired district.
Sometimes, district lines are specifically drawn to protect: a district with  
constituents favorably disposed to a candidate may be stretched to accommodate  
the home of the candidate in question, so that she may run in more favorable  
circumstances. In other circumstances, the lines are drawn to injure. For example, 
a district may be drawn to carve the home of a threatening challenger or long-
standing incumbent out of an otherwise coherent neighborhood, separating the 
politician from her likely base of success. Or the lines may be drawn to place 
two incumbents’ homes (usually, but not always, of the same party) in the same 
district, forcing them to run against each other, and using one incumbent to 
knock the other out of the legislature.181 
A handful of states have responded to these incentives by prohibiting those 
drawing the lines from acknowledging a candidate’s residence. (Some preclude 
the use of incumbents’ homes, but not challengers’ homes; others prohibit 
using any person’s residence as a basis for drawing a district.) In theory, such a 
rule limits insiders’ ability to gerrymander for individual or partisan gain, and 
instead focuses attention on group-oriented concerns. Critics, however, believe 
that such rules are honored largely in the breach: legislative confidants may 
know their legislators’ homes well, and may simply draw the districts around 
residences without acknowledging that they are doing so. Moreover, without 
knowledge of a candidate’s home, lines may unwittingly separate the candidate 
from the heart of her district or pair two incumbents: if some redistricting 
plans maliciously carve incumbents out of the districts they represent, it is also 
possible that flying blind will achieve the same effect.182 
RELATED TOPICS:  
Turnover and Term Limits
Much of the discussion above is in some way 
concerned with turnover: using the redistricting 
process either to help voters “throw the bums 
out” or to prevent voters from doing the same. 
Redistricting, however, is at best a blunt tool to 
manage turnover. 
Campaign finance rules, ballot access rules, 
broad political trends, and a candidate’s mis-
steps in office or on the campaign trail likely 
have at least as much impact on whether the 
candidate wins or loses. Moreover, for any 
given district, turnover is a mixed blessing: it 
brings candidates with (potentially) fresh ideas 
but less experience and usually less power in 
the legislature as a whole.
Some states have directly addressed turnover 
by requiring term lmts: laws forcing long-time  
legislators, who would otherwise likely be 
re-elected, to quit after a certain number of 
years in office. There are term limits for the 
U.S. President (basically, two terms), and the 
Supreme Court has said that there cannot be 
term limits for members of Congress; as for 
state legislators, each state can decide whether 
its legislators face term limits or not. 
When term limits force an incumbent out 
of her seat, there will usually be a vigorous 
contest among multiple candidates to replace 
her – even more competitive if the districts are 
themselves balanced. Conversely, many quality 
candidates in term limit states may wait for a 
term to end rather than challenging an incum-
bent; the waiting game yields fewer contested 
elections and less turnover in the meantime.
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OTHER STRUCTURAL FEATURES
There are a few additional laws in some states that affect the structure of legislative 
districts, and thereby influence the process of drawing district lines.
NESTING 
Nesting is the process of drawing districts so that districts for the upper legislative  
chamber contain two or more intact districts for the lower legislative chamber. 
For example, if each Senate district is composed exclusively of two Assembly  
districts, the Assembly districts are said to be “nested” within the Senate districts.  
Sometimes, a nested redistricting plan is created by drawing Senate districts first,  
and dividing them in half to form Assembly districts; sometimes the Assembly  
districts are drawn first, and clumped together to form Senate districts. Districts  
can be nested, of course, only if the number of seats in the state’s lower chamber  
is a whole-number multiple of the number of upper chamber seats (e.g., 50 
Senate and 100 Assembly seats, or 33 Senate and 99 House seats).
Nesting certainly makes redistricting maps look cleaner, though the clean  
appearance alone is of questionable value. More tangibly, it reduces administrative  
burdens somewhat by reducing the number of different ballots that need to 
be prepared. And, of course, tying the maps for one legislative chamber to the 
maps for the other legislative chamber, nesting constrains the discretion of 
those drawing the lines. 
As with the other principles above, however, limiting this discretion may also 
limit the extent to which those drawing the lines are able to achieve other 
objectives. Voters’ residential patterns may make it difficult or impossible to 
draw minority opportunity districts or competitive districts in both the Senate 
and the Assembly, if the districts must be nested; without nesting, it may be 
easier to group different sets of voters for different purposes in each legislative 
chamber.183 Moreover, if Senate and Assembly districts are not nested and  
divide the state in different ways, the legislature may itself be more diverse: there 
exists the potential for some constituencies not represented in one legislative 
chamber to be represented instead in the other. Whether this potential can be 
realized depends entirely on how the communities are spread geographically 
across the state.
NESTING
NOT NESTED NESTED
SENATE
ASSEmBLY
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MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS
Multi-member districts are districts drawn just like the more familiar  
“single-member” districts, but instead send two or more representatives to  
the legislature. Since 1842, federal law has prohibited multi-member districts 
for Congress, but some state and many local legislatures still use multi-member 
districts. In states like New Jersey, one state legislative chamber is composed 
entirely of uniform multi-member districts, with 2 members apiece; in other 
states, each district is different. In 2003, for example, some New Hampshire 
districts were used to elect two state legislators apiece; other districts were 
served by up to 14 legislators.
In some instances, multi-member districts function almost like nested districts. 
In a nested system, one Senate district might have the same boundaries as two 
Assembly districts; in a multi-member system, one Senate district might have the  
same boundaries as a single Assembly district that elects two state representatives.  
Arizona, for example, uses this latter system; each district elects one state senator  
and two state representatives.184 In other cases, multi-member districts for one 
legislative chamber are not tied to the districts of the other chamber: a Senate 
district and a multi-member Assembly district are entirely unrelated.
Because multi-member districts contain multiple representatives, they will typically  
cover a larger geographical area than a district with just one representative. They  
may therefore avoid the need to divide large communities, like a city that might  
otherwise be split in awkward ways with more familiar single-member districts. 
Some systems allow representatives to be chosen from anywhere within the 
district; others limit candidates to particular areas of the district, so that a city’s 
voters might choose one representative from the north side, and one from the 
south side.
Moreover, depending on the voting rule – the system for casting and tallying  
votes in the district – multi-member districts can either squelch or foster 
minority voices. As explained above in the discussion of the Voting Rights Act, 
if each voter in the district may cast one vote for a candidate for each of the 
district’s seats, and the winners are determined by simple majority vote, the 
majority will be able to defeat minority preferences for each of the district’s 
legislators. In contrast, a voting rule like cumulative voting, used for many 
corporations; or choice voting, used for the Oscars; or another system of  
“proportional representation” may elect a variety of legislators with both majority  
and minority views, more closely approximating their relative levels of support 
within the district.185 Such rules are relatively common outside of the United 
States, and still show up in America for elections in local jurisdictions. Until 1980, 
Illinois used the cumulative voting method to elect its state representatives.186 
RELATED TOPICS: Floterial Districts
In addition to the districts discussed above, a 
few state or local legislatures permit “floterial  
districts”: districts that overlap portions of 
other districts in the same legislative chamber. 
It may be helpful to think of such districts as 
“floating above” the patchwork of more familiar 
districts: in the overlap areas, a voter can vote 
for both a candidate in the “regular” district and 
a candidate in the “floterial” district. 
Sometimes, such districts may be used to 
maintain community boundaries without  
sacrificing equal population. For example, imagine 
a state where each district has to have 100  
voters, but there are two adjacent towns with 
150 voters apiece. One solution would create 
three mutually exclusive districts, each with 
100 voters, carving up the towns. 
A different solution would create a district 
of 150 voters for each town, plus one floterial 
district elected by the 300 voters of both towns 
together. In either case, 300 people elect 3  
representatives total, so overall voting power is 
the same, though the floterial districts essentially 
give each voter two legislative representatives.
WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING WHERE SHOULD THE LINES BE DRAWN?
STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES
  KEEP  
  POPULATION 
  SUBSTANTIALLY 
  EQUAL
ak		 	Yes
†
al	 Yes	
ar	 Yes	
az	 Yes	
ca	 Yes
co	 At	most	5%		
	 	 total	deviation
ct	 Yes	
de	 Yes
fl	 Yes
ga	 Yes
hi		 Yes
ia		 At	most		
	 	 1%	average		
	 	 deviation,	
	 	 at	most		
	 	 5%	total		
	 	 deviation
id		 Yes
il		 Yes
in		 Yes
ks	 Yes
ky	 Yes
la	 Yes
ma	 Yes
md	 Yes
 DRAW COMPACT 
DISTRICTS 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
Yes
Yes	
	
Area	of	circle	with	
same	perimeter
Yes
Total	perimeter	
	
Yes
Length-width,	
total	perimeter	
	
	
	
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FOLLOW POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
County	
(for	the	Senate)
County	
(for	the	Senate)
Yes	
Yes
Yes	
Town	
(for	the	House)
Census	tract
Yes	
	
	
	
	
County,	Precinct
Yes
County
Yes
County,	Town,	City
Yes
PRESERVE 
COMMUNITIES  
OF INTEREST 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)*
Yes
Yes	
	
Yes	
Yes
Yes	
	
Yes
	
	
	
	
	
Yes
Yes
NEST SENATE AND 
HOUSE DISTRICTS 
 
Required
	
	
Required	
	
	
Required	if	practicable
Required	
	
	
	
	
Required	
Required
ELECT MULTIPLE 
MEMBERS FROM  
ONE DISTRICT 
	
Permitted	
Required	
	
	
Floterial	permitted
Permitted
Permitted
	
	
	
	
	
Required
Permitted
*	 	In	most	states,	standards	like	requiring	compactness,	following	political	boundaries,	and	preserving	communities	of	interest	must	be	followed	only	as	closely	“as	
is	practicable,”	leaving	substantial	flexibility	to	the	redistricting	body.	That	is,	a	redistricting	body	must	generally	draw	districts	that	are	compact,	but	individual	
districts	may	be	noncompact	in	order	to	serve	other	objectives.	And	in	every	state,	such	standards	are	always	subordinate	to	federal	equal	population	limits	and	to	
the	federal	Voting	Rights	Act.
†
	 	A	“yes”	entry	in	this	table	indicates	a	legal	requirement	that	is	not	more	precisely	articulated:	for	example,	a	requirement	that	districts	must	have	“substantially	
equal”	population	or	that	they	must	be	“compact.”
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES (cont’d)
  KEEP  
  POPULATION 
  SUBSTANTIALLY 
  EQUAL
me		 	Yes
†
mi		 	Yes	
mn	 At	most		
	 	 2%	deviation		
	 	 from	ideal
mo		 	Yes
ms		 	Yes	
mt	 At	most	1%		
	 	 deviation	from		
	 	 ideal,	except	to		
	 	 keep	political		
	 	 boundaries		
	 	 intact
nc		 Yes
nd		 Yes
ne		 Yes
nh		 Yes
nj		 Yes
nm		 Yes
nv		 Yes
ny		 Yes	
oh		 Yes	
ok		 Yes
or		 Yes
pa		 Yes	
ri		 Yes
 DRAW COMPACT 
DISTRICTS 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
Yes
Area	of	circle	
around	district
Yes	
	
Yes
Yes	
Length-width	
	
	
	
	
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
9
Yes
Yes	
Yes	
Yes	(for	the	Senate)
Yes	
Yes
FOLLOW POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
Yes
County	
County,	City,	Town	
	
County
County,		
Election	district
County,	City	
	
	
	
	
County
County,	City
County
Town,	Ward,	Place
Municipality
County,	Town,		
City	block
County,	Township,		
Municipality,	City	ward
County
Yes
County,	City,	Town,	
Ward
Yes	
10
PRESERVE 
COMMUNITIES  
OF INTEREST 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)*
Yes
	
Yes	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Yes
	
	
Yes	(for	the	Senate)
Yes
NEST SENATE AND 
HOUSE DISTRICTS 
 
	
Required	
	
	
Required	
	
	
	
	
Required
Required
	
Required	
Required
ELECT MULTIPLE 
MEMBERS FROM  
ONE DISTRICT 
 
 
 
Floterial	permitted	
	
	
	
	
	
Only	if	necessary
Permitted
Permitted
Required
9
	 	In	New	Jersey,	the	courts	have	said	that	noncompact	districts	may	be	tolerated	to	achieve	partisan	balance,	but	not	to	achieve	partisan	advantage.	See	Davenport	v.	
Apportionment	Commission,	319 A.2d 718,722-23	(N.J.	1974).	
10
	 	In	Rhode	Island,	the	courts	have	interpreted	the	state	constitutional	requirement	that	districts	be	“compact”	to	include	more	than	geometric	regularity	of	district	
shape,	including	the	idea	that	districts	should	generally	follow	political	boundaries.	See,	e.g.,	Parella	v.	Montalbano,	899 A.2d	1226	(R.I.	2006);	see	also	2001 R.I. 
Pub. Laws ch. 315.
*	 	In	most	states,	standards	like	requiring	compactness,	following	political	boundaries,	and	preserving	communities	of	interest	must	be	followed	only	as	closely	“as	
is	practicable,”	leaving	substantial	flexibility	to	the	redistricting	body.	That	is,	a	redistricting	body	must	generally	draw	districts	that	are	compact,	but	individual	
districts	may	be	noncompact	in	order	to	serve	other	objectives.	And	in	every	state,	such	standards	are	always	subordinate	to	federal	equal	population	limits	and	to	
the	federal	Voting	Rights	Act.
†
	 	A	“yes”	entry	in	this	table	indicates	a	legal	requirement	that	is	not	more	precisely	articulated:	for	example,	a	requirement	that	districts	must	have	“substantially	
equal”	population	or	that	they	must	be	“compact.”
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STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS:  WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES (cont’d)
  KEEP  
  POPULATION 
  SUBSTANTIALLY 
  EQUAL
sc		 	Yes
†
sd		 	Yes
tn		 	Yes	
tx		 	Yes
ut		 	Yes
va		 	Yes
vt		 	Yes
wa		 	Yes
wi		 	Yes
wv		 	Yes	
wy		 	Yes
 DRAW COMPACT 
DISTRICTS 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
Yes
Yes	
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes	(for	the	Senate)
FOLLOW POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)* 
Yes
Split	at	most	
30	counties
County
County
County,	Municipality
Ward
County		
(for	the	Senate)
PRESERVE 
COMMUNITIES  
OF INTEREST 
(WHEN PRACTICABLE)*
Yes	
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NEST SENATE AND 
HOUSE DISTRICTS 
 
Required
	
Required
Required
ELECT MULTIPLE 
MEMBERS FROM  
ONE DISTRICT 
Required
	
Permitted
Permitted
Required
Permitted	
Permitted
*	 	In	most	states,	standards	like	requiring	compactness,	following	political	boundaries,	and	preserving	communities	of	interest	must	be	followed	only	as	closely	“as	
is	practicable,”	leaving	substantial	flexibility	to	the	redistricting	body.	That	is,	a	redistricting	body	must	generally	draw	districts	that	are	compact,	but	individual	
districts	may	be	noncompact	in	order	to	serve	other	objectives.	And	in	every	state,	such	standards	are	always	subordinate	to	federal	equal	population	limits	and	to	
the	federal	Voting	Rights	Act.
†
	 	A	“yes”	entry	in	this	table	indicates	a	legal	requirement	that	is	not	more	precisely	articulated:	for	example,	a	requirement	that	districts	must	have	“substantially	
equal”	population	or	that	they	must	be	“compact.”
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CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS:  WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES
SPECIFIC STATE CRITERIA FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 11
	 ak	 1	congressional	district	 	 mt 1	congressional	district
	 al	 None	 	 nc None
	 ar	 None
12
	 	 nd 1	congressional	district
	 az	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 ne None
	 ca	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 nh None
	 co	 None	 	 nj None
	 ct	 None	 	 nm None
	 de	 1	congressional	district	 	 nv None
	 fl	 None	 	 ny None
	 ga	 None	 	 oh None
	 hi	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 ok None
	 ia	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 or Same	as	state	districts
	 id	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 pa None
	 il	 None	 	 ri None
	 in	 None	 	 sc None
	 ks	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 sd 1	congressional	district
	 ky	 None	 	 tn None
	 la	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 tx None
	 ma	 None	 	 ut None
	 md	 None	 	 va Same	as	state	districts
	 me	 Mostly	the	same	as	state	districts
13
	 	 vt 1	congressional	district
	 mi	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 wa Same	as	state	districts
	 mn	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 wi None
	 mo	 Same	as	state	districts	 	 wv None
12
	 ms	 None	 	 wy 1	congressional	district
11
	 	The	Supreme	Court	has	required	that	all	congressional	districts	within	a	state	must	be	as	equal	in	population	as	possible.	This	table	summarizes	additional		
requirements,	imposed	by	each	state,	for	drawing	their	congressional	districts.
12
	 	In	the	2001	cycle,	Arkansas	and	West	Virginia	drew	congressional	districts	consisting	entirely	of	whole	counties,	without	further	equalizing	population.		
See	Ark. Code §§ 7-2-101	–	105;	W. Va. Code § 1-2-3.	These	districts	have	not	been	challenged	in	court.
13
	 	For	its	state	legislative	districts,	Maine	requires	that	its	advisory	commission	“give	weight	to	the	interests	of	local	communities.”	Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A,	§ 1206-A.		
There	is	no	similar	requirement	for	congressional	districts.
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
There are no silver redistricting bullets, no single set of structures or principles 
or criteria that are uniformly “best.” 
Different people have different legitimate goals for political representation –  
different ideas about how the public should be represented, how power should 
be apportioned, which political cleavages matter and which do not, how to 
make the various tradeoffs when goals conflict, and even different ideas about 
who should decide the answer to these questions, and how. 
Accordingly, different people offer different assessments of the most pressing 
problem with their own status quo, and the most promising solution. Some 
think that the existing process for redrawing their legislative lines is just fine. 
Others bemoan a conflict of interest at work in drawing the lines. Still others 
complain that their districts look aesthetically bizarre, or that they promote 
lopsided elections, or that they overvalue certain votes and undervalue others,  
or that they split towns, or that they fracture real communities, be they racial 
or ethnic or cultural or economic or ideological or defined by some other 
characteristic.
In order to figure out whether a particular system is flawed, and another best 
suited to your goals, you first have to agree on what you’re trying to accomplish. 
If the system must be designed to fulfill several goals at once, the process of 
accommodation and compromise will inevitably leave some goals less than 
optimally fulfilled. Moreover, a redistricting system may work wonderfully in 
one state and disastrously in another. Laws interact with each other, and yield 
different effects in different political cultures and demographic climates.  
Context matters – quite a bit.
That said, there are a few ideas that we at the Brennan Center suggest considering. 
On balance, we feel that they further the goals that we think important out of a 
redistricting process: district lines drawn by a meaningfully independent body 
with meaningful guidance, constraint, and transparency, designed to achieve 
meaningful and equitable diversity of representation. Others will have different 
goals, and different preferred means to accomplish them.
These ideas also reflect our belief that it is important to tailor reforms to root 
problems, rather than merely to attack symptoms. It is undeniably true that 
many current legislative districts look strange on paper, and many districts are  
packed with like-minded partisans. These symptoms, however, would not concern 
us if there were nevertheless fair and equitable representation for real communities  
by politicians accountable to their constituents. Rather, the symptoms cause 
concern because they reflect a deeper problem with the current process in most 
states: an inevitable incentive for incumbents to pick and choose various voters 
for various districts – at the expense of real communities, and thereby to the 
detriment of the legislative process as a whole. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Our goals:
 • Meaningful independence
 • Meaningful guidance
 •  Meaningful and equitable diversity  
of representation
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We take primary aim at that natural incentive. Most of the ideas below thus  
reflect our attempt to find trusted decision-makers with meaningful independence 
from the incumbents to be elected from the districts in question, and to vest 
these decision-makers with power and flexibility to reconcile competing objectives  
and arrive at any number of discrete compromises. Given that redistricting  
decisions are inevitably fraught with both intended and unintended consequences, 
we aim to establish boundaries for those who draw the lines, without forcing 
them into a straitjacket.187 
Many of these ideas may work effectively only if implemented in tandem with 
each other, and in tandem with other electoral reforms, including laws governing  
campaign finance and ballot access. Some of these ideas are already governing 
redistricting decisions somewhere in the country; others are merely proposals 
or ideas in need of further study. Similarly, some may be politically feasible 
tomorrow; others will likely face a much longer incubation period. Moreover, 
we do not pretend that the ideas below represent an exclusive list; innovation is 
continuous, and there are likely additional worthy ideas just around the corner.
IDEAS WORTH CONSIDERING,  
FROM EXISTING MODELS
 •  Redistrict only once per decade (see page 16). Eighteen states currently 
prohibit redistricting more than once per decade for state legislative districts, 
and four do the same for congressional districts. Although this rule 
maintains the status quo even when districts represent outdated demographic 
profiles toward the end of a decade, it should on balance promote stability 
and avoid the exaggerated effects of repeated gerrymanders.188 
 •  Use an independent commission (see page 22). Independence in this 
context is not an attempt to force individuals to abandon their private 
partisan affiliations or leanings, or to find individuals who have neither; 
rather, it attempts to sever the tie between incumbent legislators and the 
ability to draw the districts where they will run. Five states use independent 
commissions to draw state legislative or congressional district lines, or 
both. The American Bar Association189 recently adopted a recommendation  
that every state follow suit. If designed appropriately – a very big “if ” 
– independent commissions can avoid the motivation for shenanigans 
like drawing districts to exclude a potent challenger. And they may be the 
only effective means to do so.190 
 •  Empower a redistricting body of appropriate size (see page 26).  
A redistricting body of 5 or even 7 individuals may be too small to reflect  
the diversity of a state in any meaningful way.191 Groups larger than 15 may  
be too large to function smoothly. Somewhere in between, a redistricting 
body may be able to represent – and effectively negotiate compromise 
among – many of the state’s constituencies.
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 •  Maintain partisan balance (see page 25). Given the consistent mischief to 
other objectives wrought by overly partisan redistricting plans, the partisan 
composition of a redistricting body should not be left to chance. Several 
states deploy bodies with an even number of line-drawers selected by 
the legislative leaders (and presumably evenly affiliated with each major 
party); those partisans must then agree on a tiebreaker. Other proposals 
permit multiple tiebreakers. Still others would allow a body like the state 
Supreme Court to nominate tiebreakers, subject to the legislative leaders’ 
veto.192 Arizona creates a role in the nominating process for individuals 
unaffiliated with either major political party; it may be wise to consider 
requiring that the tiebreaker be similarly unaffiliated. 
 •  Preserve independence through the body’s composition (see page 24).  
A redistricting body is not necessarily independent from self-interested  
legislators even when no members are incumbents. Arizona uses a 
nonpartisan body distinct from the legislature to designate nominees; 
although the legislative leaders choose 4 of its 5 independent commissioners 
from this nominee pool, the fifth is chosen not by the legislative leadership, 
but by agreement of the other four commissioners. Idaho prohibits recent 
lobbyists or candidates for office from sitting on its commission. Bills in 
other states would prohibit relatives of legislators or recent legislative staff 
or employees from sitting on a commission as well.193 Still other proposals 
would subject commission staff to the same restrictions.
 •  Preserve independence through the body’s procedures (see page 39). 
The more transparent the redistricting proceedings, the less motivation 
to serve the narrow immediate interests of individual incumbents. Several 
states conduct redistricting business only in public session, with ample 
notice before meetings are held, and at least some opportunity for public 
testimony. Proposals expand on these open meetings procedures by  
suggesting a ban on pertinent ex parte communications, other than 
between commissioners and their staff.194 Transparency is also furthered 
in states that make demographic and political data available to the public, 
and that facilitate public comments and public submission of districting  
proposals. Some proposals would expand on this give-and-take, by 
requiring the redistricting body to produce a public report stating the 
reasons for each choice of district lines.
 •  Preserve independence through the body’s funding. A body may be 
composed of independent personnel, with independent procedures, 
and still be dependent on the legislature for its funding. In Alaska, the 
legislature expressed its displeasure with a commission’s lines by limiting 
the commission’s budget and funding a lawsuit against the commission’s 
work.195 Arizona’s constitution, in contrast, sets forth a structure for 
funding its independent commission well before the commission’s work 
begins. With funding secure, the commission may draw the district lines 
without feeling beholden to the legislature’s power of the purse.
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 •  Allow the legislature a final tweak (see page 23). One of the downsides 
of independent redistricting is that legislators really do tend to know their  
districts inside and out. Allowing the legislature a final opportunity to 
tweak commission lines may both facilitate the passage of redistricting  
reform in the first place, and permit an escape valve to correct unintended 
negative consequences of particular redistricting decisions, at least on the 
margins. Washington State allows its legislature to modify a commission’s 
plan, affecting no more than 2% of the population in any given district, 
and only if it can muster a 2/3 vote in each house. Requiring the legislature 
to justify any such changes publicly may mitigate the potential to use this 
safety valve for legislators’ narrow personal gain.
 •  Expressly prioritize criteria (see page 42). Several states require their 
redistricting bodies to abide by several criteria when drawing the lines 
(e.g., a 5% population variance, preserved county lines). Few, however, 
expressly designate which criteria should yield to the others in the event 
of a conflict (Arizona, Colorado, and Iowa are among the few exceptions).  
States should expressly remind redistricting bodies that they must first 
comply with federal constitutional equal protection mandates and the 
statutory requirements of the Voting Rights Act – but beyond that, it is 
also useful to clearly designate some criteria as more important, others as 
subsidiary, and still others as equally important and therefore able to yield 
to each other according to the demands of the local political geography. 
Clear priorities let the public, those drawing the lines, and the courts that 
may eventually review a plan know what to expect.196 It is also important 
to keep in mind that if it a plan places a high priority on maximizing or  
minimizing easily measured criteria, like county splits or population equality 
or compactness or competition, the mathematical imperative could  
prevent substantial consideration of criteria designated a lower priority.
 •  Protect minority representation (see page 47). California’s state Voting 
Rights Act makes dilution easier to prove, and provides protections for 
dispersed minorities that may extend beyond the safeguards offered by 
the federal Voting Rights Act. Localities are free to experiment with vari-
ous policies, including different districting schemes and different voting 
rules: the overriding question is merely ensuring that minority votes are 
not systematically diluted. Several upcoming lawsuits involving provi-
sions of the federal Voting Rights Act will better indicate whether such 
provisions are likely to withstand legal challenge.
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 •  Allow meaningful space for communities of interest (see page 54). 
The residential housing patterns of various communities do not always 
conform to neat political, geographic, or geometric demarcations, and as 
a result, many states expressly grant their redistricting bodies discretion to 
draw district lines that maintain the integrity of particular communities 
of interest. One means to ensure space for such communities is to priori-
tize their protection; another means is simply to leave sufficient flexibility 
in the other criteria that those drawing the lines will be able to bend a 
line, on the margins, in order to keep a community intact.197 Under either 
approach, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether communities of 
interest in a given state can be more objectively “grounded” by requiring  
that they be composed of whole census tracts.198 And under either approach,  
it may be worthwhile to require that the redistricting body publicly identify 
the particular community protected by any district’s deviation from 
other, more objective, criteria.199 
 •  Reveal information sequentially (see page 63). In any redistricting 
system with partisan actors, the temptation to use political data to try to 
secure partisan advantage is immense. Arizona attempts to address this 
problem by forbidding the use of party registration and voter history data 
until a draft set of maps is drawn, at which point the political data may 
be used to double-check for unintended consequences – but without  
political data, it is impossible to check for full compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act, and Arizona’s first state legislative maps were indeed 
rejected by the Department of Justice.200 That said, it may be worth  
considering using Arizona’s model not for all political data, but for  
candidate residence.201 It may also be worth considering publishing the 
final draft maps, before candidates’ residences are revealed, in order to 
anchor the (potentially) less politicized draft.
 •  Provide for streamlined court review (see page 27). Redistricting plans 
are often challenged in court by those who fear losing voting power under  
the new plan. Without a designated forum for resolving these disputes, 
litigants may “shop” among various state and federal courts for the judge 
or judges that seem most favorably inclined; those decisions are inevitably 
appealed, consuming precious time in an election cycle. Several states 
have limited the potential for strategic gaming and delay by giving one 
state court – usually the state’s Supreme Court – exclusive jurisdiction 
over any challenge.202 Though this will not eliminate accusations of  
partisanship, it at least speeds the resolution of any litigation. These states 
may also require the court to place the highest priority on redistricting 
cases, to further limit the chance of uncertainty over redistricting lines as 
the upcoming elections approach. 
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IDEAS WORTH CONSIDERING,  
NOT YET IMPLEMENTED STATEWIDE
 •  Count prisoners at home (see page 16). Incarcerated individuals – dispro-
portionately poor and minorities – are currently tallied for redistricting 
purposes where they are imprisoned. This artificially inflates the voting 
power of prison districts, where the prisoners generally cannot vote and are  
not meaningfully represented, at the expense of their home communities. 
Incarcerated individuals should be counted for redistricting purposes in 
the communities where they lived before their incarceration. In 2007,  
applicable bills were introduced in both Michigan and New York.
 •  Promote diversity in the redistricting body (see page 26). A redistricting  
body should optimally reflect the diversity of its state; those selecting the  
members of such a body should be instructed accordingly. In New York 
in 2006, a bill required those appointing members of an independent 
commission to “give due consideration to reflecting the geographic, ethnic, 
and racial diversity of the state in appointments to the commission.”203 
This balances the need for a clear mandate with the need to avoid potential 
constitutional difficulty.
 •  Preserve independence through the body’s voting rule (see page 26). 
In many commission proposals, there is much importance placed on a 
tiebreaker, selected by a majority of commissioners otherwise affiliated 
with or selected by partisan interests. This tiebreaker should be relatively 
neutral, or at least acceptable to commissioners from both major parties. 
There still exists the possibility, however, that he or she will be outvoted. 
In order to mitigate the possibility of bipartisan collusion, the support of 
that tiebreaker should be required to pass any given plan.204 
 •  Provide for partisan balance in the body’s staff (see page 25). No one 
is more important and less visible in the redistricting process than the 
technical consultants who actually supply the data, advise the decision-
makers of the redistricting body, and execute the mechanics of drawing 
the lines themselves.205 No law regulating the redistricting process has 
yet sought to ensure that the responsibilities of the posts are carried out 
in a bipartisan, multi-partisan, or nonpartisan manner. To guard against 
partisan bias in the crucial mechanics of redistricting, the responsibilities 
of the chief consultant to the redistricting body should be split between 
representatives of the major political parties. Furthermore, if a commission 
is deployed with safeguards to preserve the commissioners’ independence, 
staff should be selected using safeguards no less robust.
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 •  Use a flexible equal population standard (see page 42). The constitution  
generally requires state legislative districts with no more than 10% total 
population variance; various states have set themselves still lower thresholds.  
A proposal in New York in 2006 took a slightly different approach,  
requiring groups of neighboring districts to reflect the appropriate 
proportion of the statewide population: 10% of the districts should have 
about 10% of the population, 20% of the districts should have about 
20% of the population, etc. This allows flexibility for an individual 
district or two to be slightly over- or under-populated in pursuit of other 
goals, but also ensures that no substantial region of the state has districts 
that are consistently over- or underpopulated.
 •  Employ “accountability seats” (see page 57).206 Much of the partisan  
dissatisfaction with particular districting plans stems from the gap between 
overall statewide support for a party and the proportion of districts that 
party is able to win: it seems intuitively unfair to many that a party can 
have 65% support but win only 52% of the legislative seats. To some extent, 
that gap is inherent in any majority-win districted system. “Accountability  
seats” – known in academic circles as a mixed-member proportional 
voting system – help reduce the disparity. In a system with accountability  
seats, most of the legislative seats – say 80 out of 100 – are familiar; 
citizens vote for candidates in those districts just as they do today. The 
remaining 20 seats, the “accountability seats,” are used to bring a party’s 
representation in the legislature in line with its statewide support. So, for 
example, if the Republicans won 44 of the 80 districted seats, but won 
statewide support of 58%, Republicans would be assigned 14 of the 20 
accountability seats, filled through a statewide party list. In total, the 
Republicans would have 58 of the 100 legislative seats, matching their 
overall statewide showing.
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THE REFORM PROCESS
Just as there is no single optimal redistricting system for all purposes, there is 
no single optimal path to reform. In some states, the voters have pushed reform 
directly, through the initiative process, or found a champion of reform in the 
governor’s mansion. In other states, a legislative majority sensing a shift in the 
political winds has sought reform, in part, to stave off the excesses of a retributive  
redistricting effort by an opposing party on the threshold of power. 
Still, recent experience with reform proposals, successful and unsuccessful, does 
suggest a few best practices for those seeking reform. Again, we do not pretend 
that the lessons below represent an exclusive list, or that they guarantee success  
if properly implemented. Nevertheless, we hope that they increase the likelihood 
that reform can be achieved … and that it will deliver the benefits anticipated.
 •  Address the problem, not the symptom. The most obvious signs of 
redistricting dysfunction may be symptoms, not problems. For example, 
some reformers highlight districts with exceedingly irregular shape, but 
do not believe that a district’s shape itself either impedes or facilitates fair 
and equitable representation. Focusing on symptoms may lead to “solutions” 
that do not correct the underlying problems with the status quo – or that 
lead to other undesirable consequences. Reformers are better served by 
thinking through the goals of representation and the ways in which those 
goals are not adequately served by the status quo.
 •  Do not overpromise. Proponents of the redistricting initiative approved 
by Arizona voters in 2000 emphasized its potential to create more  
competition. However, the initiative proposal itself allowed the new 
redistricting commission to consider competition only after satisfying 
several other criteria;207 furthermore, competitive districts increase the 
likelihood of, but do not guarantee, competitive races. When the first few 
elections in the new districts were not substantially competitive, some 
were disgruntled, and the public debate over the extent of the commis-
sion’s obligation to create competition spilled over into the courts.208 This 
rancor was caused, in part, by the way in which the reform was marketed, 
and might have been avoided with a more balanced sales pitch.
 •  Engage minority constituencies early. In substantial part because of the 
Voting Rights Act, minority legislators now occupy some senior legislative  
positions, and may be suspicious of attempts to remove redistricting power 
from the legislature just as they have arrived in positions of substantial 
influence. Proponents of reform should engage minority constituencies 
early in the process, to ensure that proposals adequately protect minority 
rights, and to gather support, tacit or explicit, for the need for reform.209 
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 •  Leave time for education. Research shows that knowledge about how 
districts are currently drawn, much less the available alternatives, is not 
widespread. Where public approval is part of the reform process, proponents 
would do well to leave ample time for education. In Arizona, for example,  
the 2000 initiative was the culmination of a decade of reform efforts in 
the public eye.
 •  Beware the enthusiastic support of only one major party. Redistricting  
initiatives failed in 2006 in both California and Ohio, in part, because 
they were perceived as attempted partisan power grabs: by Republicans 
in California and by Democrats in Ohio. Enthusiastic support by one 
major party – without equivalent enthusiasm from the other – could well 
prove fatal to a public initiative in a closely divided state, no matter how 
substantial the nonpartisan credentials behind the idea.210 
 •  Pay attention to the effective date of the proposal. Proposals that have 
called for redrawing the district lines immediately upon the reform’s passage 
have been repeatedly portrayed as partisan power-grabs by whichever 
party stands to benefit most in the short term – and that characterization  
has hastened their defeat.211 It may seem frustrating, given the effort required  
for any redistricting reform, to postpone the effects until the next regular 
redistricting, just after the census. Reform delayed, however, may be 
preferable to reform denied. 
 •  Draw test maps to look for unintended consequences. In the abstract, 
it is difficult to gauge the practical impact of multiple conflicting criteria 
that a redistricting body may have to consider. After agreeing on the 
goals that redistricting reform should serve, and developing a structure 
to further those ends, drawing a few test maps may reveal unanticipated 
effects of the structure in question. The point is not the appearance of a 
final plan, but an understanding of the constraints in place throughout 
the process: an instruction to minimize county splits or to nest Senate 
and Assembly districts, for example, may limit available options in a 
way that only becomes clear once you start drawing. Test maps can also 
reveal unanticipated quirks of a state’s political geography.212 In Ohio, for 
example, some townships are not contiguous, and look more like shotgun 
spray than regular polygons; a proposal that would preserve townships 
in a single district therefore creates constraints that may not be obvious 
from the text of the proposal itself.
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APPENDIX A. 
RECAP OF REDISTRICTING CHOICES
The list below recaps some of the choices involved in a redistricting system. 
There are other options, not listed here; this summary is intended only as a 
sort of quick-reference reminder of the choices to be confronted. As discussed 
frequently throughout this paper, some or all of these choices may conflict with 
each other, and it may be necessary to prioritize among them.
WHEN TO DRAW
 •  Once per decade: Districts may be redrawn only once per decade
 •  More than once: Districts may be redrawn more than once per decade, 
at certain times (e.g., if a court declares a plan invalid, or if a court draws 
a plan because the primary body ran out of time)
 •  As often as desired: Districts may be redrawn as often as desired
WHO DRAWS
PRINCIPAL STRUCTURE
 •  Legislature: The legislature draws the lines
 •  Advisory commission: An advisory commission creates a draft plan, 
which the legislature can adopt, modify, or ignore
 •  Backup commission: The legislature draws the lines, but a backup  
commission steps in if the legislature cannot come to an agreement
 •  Commission + legislature: A non-legislative commission draws the  
lines, but the legislature can modify the plan in moderate fashion
 •  Commission: A non-legislative commission draws the lines
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ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS
 •  Legislature: The legislature draws the lines, so all legislators (at least in 
the majority party) are directly involved in drawing the lines
 •  Politician commission: Some legislators (usually the leadership) are on 
the commission that draws the lines
 •  Leadership chooses: Some legislators (usually the leadership) select some 
or all of the commissioners who draw the lines; though they don’t draw 
the lines themselves, they indirectly control the process
 •  No legislators: No legislators are involved, directly or indirectly
 •  No legislators or staff: Neither legislators nor legislative staff or lobbyists 
are involved, directly or indirectly
ROLE OF GOVERNOR
 •  Veto: The governor may veto a proposed plan
 •  No veto: The governor may not veto a proposed plan
VOTING RULE
 •  Majority: A simple majority is enough to approve a plan
 •  Tiebreaker: A simple majority is enough to approve a plan, but that 
majority must include the vote of a relatively neutral tiebreaker
 •  Supermajority: A supermajority is required to approve a plan
PARTISANSHIP
 •  Always partisan: The redistricting body will almost always have a partisan 
imbalance (e.g., the legislature draws the lines, or a commission is composed 
of an odd number of elected officials)
 •  Sometimes partisan: The redistricting body will sometimes have a partisan 
imbalance (e.g., the legislature draws the lines with a gubernatorial veto,  
or commissioners are chosen in such a way that it’s possible but not certain  
to have more from one party than from another)
 •  Bipartisan: The redistricting body is divided between the major parties
 •  Multipartisan: The redistricting body is evenly multipartisan
 •  Tiebreaker: The redistricting body is evenly bipartisan or multipartisan, 
with a tiebreaker chosen by members of both or multiple parties
 •  Nonpartisan: The redistricting body is structured to be nonpartisan
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WHO DRAWS (CONT’D)
SIzE OF THE BODY
 •  Legislature: The redistricting body is as large as the legislature
 •  9-15 members: The redistricting body is a commission of 9-15 people
 •  3-7 members: The redistricting body is a commission of 3-7 people
 •  Sole decision maker: One person draws the lines
DIVERSITY
 •  Geographic: The redistricting body reflects geographic diversity
 •  Race/Ethnicity: The redistricting body reflects racial or ethnic diversity
 •  Gender: The redistricting body reflects gender diversity
 •  Partisan: The redistricting body reflects partisan diversity
COURTS
 •  Empowered: Courts may draw district lines themselves (if the main 
redistricting body violates the law, or fails to act in time)
 •  Deferential: If lines are illegal, the main redistricting body redraws the 
lines; courts may draw lines only if the main body does not act in time
 •  Open: Any court can hear challenges to redistricting plans
 •  Supreme Court: No state court other than the state Supreme Court can 
hear redistricting challenges, and those cases get priority on the docket
 •  Automatic: The state Supreme Court will automatically review any plan, 
without the need to file a challenge 
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HOW TO DRAW 
STARTING POINT
 •  Current map: Lines are redrawn starting with the existing district lines
 •  Set point: Lines are redrawn starting anew at a certain point of the map
 •  Grid: Lines are redrawn starting anew with a regular grid
 •  No constraint: No particular starting point is determined 
DISCRETION
 •  Full discretion: The redistricting body has full discretion to draw lines as 
it pleases, with no constraints other than federal law
 •  Some constraints: The redistricting body has some discretion to draw 
the lines, but only within constraints set by the state
 •  Automatic: The redistricting body is essentially ministerial, and only acts 
to decide which plans best maximize certain criteria
TRANSPARENCY
 •  Closed-door: Lines are redrawn in private
 •  Data available: Redistricting data is made available to the public,  
possibly with software to use the data
 •  Public submission: The public may submit redistricting plans
 •  Hearings: Hearings are held to discuss redistricting plans, potentially 
with draft maps publicized for specific public input
 •  Justification: Final plans are submitted with a written justification of  
the particular choices made
 •  Open meetings: All meetings of the redistricting body are or will be  
public, either at the time or preserved for later public disclosure
 •  Ex parte contacts: All contacts with members of the redistricting body 
are public, either at the time or preserved for later public disclosure
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WHERE TO DRAW 
EQUAL POPULATION
 •  Federal limit: The largest district is no more than 10% larger than the 
smallest district 
 •  Proportion: 10% of the districts must contain approximately 10% of the 
population, but individual districts may deviate somewhat
 •  Total deviation: The largest district is no more than X% larger than the 
smallest district 
 •  Average deviation: The districts deviate no more than X% from the ideal 
population, on average
 •  Individual deviation: Each district is not more than X% different from 
the ideal population
 •  Absolute equality: There is as little difference between each district’s 
population as possible
MINORITY REPRESENTATION
 •  Federal limit: The plan complies with the Voting Rights Act
 •  Independent protection: The plan prevents dilution of minority votes, 
no matter how the federal Voting Rights Act is interpreted
 •  Eased proof of violation: The state has a standard of proof for vote  
dilution that is easier to meet than the federal Voting Rights Act
 •  Voting rule: The plan incorporates districts with different voting rules, 
which prevent minority vote dilution without drawing specific minority 
opportunity districts
CONTIGUITY
 •  Non-contiguous: Some districts are not contiguous
 •  Water: All districts are contiguous except when crossing water
 •  Contiguous: All districts are fully contiguous, including districts that 
span water, but are joined by bridges or ferry routes
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COMPACTNESS
 •  Noncompact: Some districts are not compact
 •  General: Districts seem compact by eyeballing, but there is no standard 
definition of compactness
 •  Perimeter: Districts must meet a threshold limit of compactness, using 
one of the measures driven by district perimeter
 •  Dispersion: Districts must meet a threshold limit of compactness, using 
one of the measures driven by district dispersion
 •  Population: Districts must meet a threshold limit of compactness, using 
one of the measures driven by population center of gravity
 •  Max compact: Districts must be drawn to maximize a compactness 
score, using a specific measure
POLITICAL / GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES
 •  No constraint: There is no particular need to follow political or  
geographic boundaries
 •  General: Districts generally follow political and geographic boundaries 
when that does not interfere with other objectives
 •  Total counties: Districts split no more than X number of counties
 •  Minimum counties: Districts split the minimum number of counties
 •  Minimum splits: Districts split the minimum number of counties, 
towns, wards, precincts, and blocks
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
 •  No constraint: There is no particular need to draw districts to encompass 
communities of interest
 •  Divide: Districts generally divide communities of interest to force legislators 
to resolve competing goals
 •  General: Districts generally preserve communities of interest whole, when  
that does not interfere with other objectives
 •  Articulate: Districts preserve communities of interest whole, and the 
redistricting body must explain the communities of interest protected
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WHERE TO DRAW (CONT’D)
COMPETITION
 •  No constraint: There is no particular need to draw districts with a  
particular political outcome in mind
 •  Draw blind: Districts must be drawn without access to data about voter 
partisanship, except where necessary to implement federal law
 •  General: Districts are generally drawn to foster district partisan balance, 
when that does not interfere with other objectives
 •  Threshold: X% of the districts must be drawn so that the partisan  
balance of the district is within 10%
 •  Maximum competition: Districts must be drawn so that as many  
districts as possible have a partisan balance within 10%
PARTISAN BIAS
 •  No constraint: There is no particular need to limit one party’s advantage 
in the likelihood of winning a total number of seats
 •  Draw blind: Districts must be drawn without access to data about voter 
partisanship, except where necessary to implement federal law
 •  Reduce bias: Districts where the likely partisan outcome reduces the 
total partisan bias are favored
 •  Minimize bias: The plan must minimize either party’s advantage in the 
likelihood of winning a total number of seats 
 •  Accountability seats: The plan sets districts aside, outside of the district 
system, to make the total seats match the total votes more closely
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CANDIDATES’ HOMES
 •  No constraint: There is no rule relating to candidates’ or incumbents’ 
homes, one way or another
 •  Incumbent protection: Two incumbents’ houses may not be put in the 
same district if possible
 •  No consideration: Districts may not be drawn in order to protect or 
harm particular candidates or incumbents
 •  Draw blind: Districts must be drawn without information about where 
candidates or incumbents live
NESTING
 •  No constraint: State House or Assembly districts need not be nested 
inside state Senate districts 
 •  Nested: State House or Assembly districts must be nested inside state 
Senate districts
 •  Floterial: Districts for the same legislative chamber may overlap each 
other
 MULTI-MEMBER DISTRICTS
 •  Single-member: All districts elect one and only one representative
 •  Multi-member: Some or all districts may elect multiple representatives
 •  Voting rule: Some or all districts may elect multiple representatives,  
using proportional voting rules like cumulative or choice voting
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APPENDIX B.  
JURISDICTIONS COVERED BY  
SECTION 5 OF THE VRA
Covered as a whole: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,  
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia
FLORIDA
Collier,	Hardee,	Hendry,	Hillsborough		
and	Monroe	Counties
SOUTH DAKOTA
Shannon	and	Todd	Counties
NEW YORK
Bronx,	Kings	and	New	York	Counties
CALIFORNIA
Kings,	Merced,	Monterey	and		
Yuba	Counties
NORTH CAROLINA
Anson,	Beaufort,	Bertie,	Bladen,		
Camden,	Caswell,	Chowan,		
Cleveland,	Craven,	Cumberland,		
Edgecomb,	Franklin,	Gaston,	Gates,	
Granville,	Green,	Guilford,	Halifax,	
Harnett,	Hertford,	Hoke,	Jackson,	Lee,	
Lenoir,	Martin,	Nash,	Northampton,		
Onslow,	Pasquotank,	Perquimans,		
Person,	Pitt,	Robeson,	Rockingham,		
Scotland,	Union,	Vane,	Washington,	
Wayne	and	Wilson	Counties
MICHIGAN
Clyde	and	Buena	Vista	Townships
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
Rindge,	Pinkhams	Grant,	Stewartstown,	
Stratford,	Benton,	Antrim,	Boscawen,	
Newington	and	Unity	Towns;	Millsfield	
Township
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concentrated group of Latino voters in another part of the state fairly far away 
– as long as these populations are sufficiently culturally similar to justify one 
district. The Supreme Court introduced the idea briefly in a 2006 case, League 
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 
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